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The Adequacy of Household Saving 
DURING THE PAST half century, retirement income security in the United
States has been based on a combination of social security, employer-
sponsored pensions, and households’ own saving. Social security was
intended to provide a retirement income base. Pensions generated addi-
tional retirement income. Households’ own saving supplemented these
sources. In many ways this combination has served retirees well, but recent
and impending developments have raised concerns about the adequacy of
households’ preparations for retirement.1
Social security faces a long-term financial imbalance, owing to length-
ening life spans, earlier retirement, and, over the next few decades, the
demographic bulge created by the retirement of the baby boom generation.
Any viable solution must in some way reduce retirement benefits or raise
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taxes.2 Private pensions have shifted away from defined benefit (DB) plans
to defined contribution (DC) plans. Although more portable than DB plans,
DC plans also give workers increased discretion over participation, con-
tribution, investment, and withdrawal decisions, and thus raise concerns
about how effectively workers will use these instruments to finance retire-
ment.3 Other household saving has fallen dramatically in recent years,
according to the National Income and Product Accounts.4 Concerns gen-
erated by these aggregate trends have been increased by numerous micro-
economic studies, reviewed below, which conclude from observed wealth
accumulation patterns that a significant portion of today’s working-age
households will be unable to maintain current living standards in
retirement.
These changing prospects for retirement income security raise a host
of issues. Key research issues revolve around the extent to which house-
holds are forward-looking and able to save sufficiently to meet future
consumption needs. Policy issues focus on the stability and direction of the
nation’s retirement system, prospects for the living standards of future
retirees, and the extent to which a lack of financial preparation will trans-
late into pressure for increased government assistance.
This paper provides a new analysis of the adequacy of household saving
and is organized as follows. In the first section we define “adequate” sav-
ing as wealth accumulation that is sufficient for households to smooth the
marginal utility of their consumption over time. We contrast our defini-
tion with alternative definitions and discuss how our definition affects the
scope of the subsequent analysis. 
In the second section we develop a stochastic life-cycle simulation
model in which households save both for retirement and as a precaution
against uncertain future earnings. The model formalizes our definition of
adequate saving and provides a set of quantitative benchmarks against
which to measure the adequacy of actual saving behavior. We use the sim-
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
2. Diamond (1997); Engen and Gale (1997).
3. Mitchell and Schieber (1998); Gale, Papke, and Vanderhei (1999).
4. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) find that official saving rates vastly underreport saving.
This is consistent with the fact that the aggregate household wealth-income ratio is at his-
torically high levels (Federal Reserve Board, 1999). But this finding may be misleading for
assessing the adequacy of a typical household’s financial preparations for retirement,
because wealth holdings are skewed in the United States (Poterba and Samwick, 1995; Ken-
nickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden, 1997). 
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ulation model to generate three results regarding optimal wealth and con-
sumption patterns. First, uncertainty about earnings implies that there
will be a distribution of optimal wealth-earnings ratios, rather than a sin-
gle benchmark ratio, among households that are otherwise observationally
equivalent (that is, have the same age, education, pension status, marital
status, and current wage). This finding fundamentally changes the inter-
pretation of observed saving patterns. In particular, it implies that some
households should be expected to exhibit low wealth-earnings ratios even
if every household is forward-looking and making optimal choices. 
Second, because of earnings uncertainty, optimal consumption rises
with age during the working years for a wide range of time preference
rates, holding interest rates and family size constant. This implies that
stated preferences about age-consumption profiles cannot be mapped eas-
ily onto an implied time preference rate, unless the full economic situation
is specified very carefully. 
Third, owing to increases in mortality risk, optimal consumption gen-
erally declines as households reach and transit through retirement. As a
result, their optimal wealth decumulation involves the eventual exhaustion
of nonannuitized assets well before the longest possible life span. These
results will prove critical in reconciling our empirical results with those
of other studies. 
The third section presents the central empirical work. Using the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) of the University of Michigan’s Institute
for Social Research and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) con-
ducted by the Federal Reserve, we examine wealth and earnings data for
married couples where the husband works full time. Because the simulation
generates a distribution of optimal wealth-earnings ratios for a given set
of household characteristics, we are unable to determine any household’s
precise optimal level of wealth. This finding shapes our empirical strategy,
which focuses mainly on two issues: determining the proportion of house-
holds in the data who exceed the simulated median wealth-earnings ratio
for households with their characteristics, and comparing the distributions of
observed and simulated wealth-earnings ratios. Using what we regard as
the most reasonable specification—a time preference rate of 3 percent and
a definition of retirement wealth that includes half or more of housing
equity—we find that more than half of households have actual wealth-
earnings ratios that exceed the median simulated wealth-earnings ratio for
households with the same characteristics. Indeed, in some cases the pro-
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 67
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portion is well above half. In addition, the simulation model underestimates
actual wealth among households with high ratios of wealth to earnings.
Both of these results suggest that wealth accumulation is adequate for a
majority of households in the sample. However, among households with
low wealth-earnings ratios there is mixed evidence of undersaving at the
5th and the 25th percentiles of the wealth-earnings distribution. 
Households that exceed the median simulated wealth-earnings ratios
differ in predictable and plausible ways from others. After other factors are
controlled for, they have more education and more pension coverage, and
they are more likely to be self-employed, to plan on retiring early, to have
thought about retirement, to have a long financial horizon, and to have
received a large inheritance. The adequacy of saving fell somewhat
between 1983 and 1995, but even for 1995 the aggregate figures indicate
that more than half of all households exceeded the simulated median
wealth-earnings ratios. 
In the paper’s fourth section we present the results of sensitivity analysis
and discuss potential biases in, and extensions of, the underlying model.
Our results are sensitive to the treatment of housing as retirement wealth
and to the time preference rate employed. The combination of excluding all
housing wealth and using a time preference rate of zero in the simulation
generates significant undersaving. We also show that variations in key pref-
erence parameters that are small—in the sense that they cannot be ruled out
on the basis of existing empirical work—can nevertheless have significant
effects on the benchmark wealth-earnings ratios. This suggests consider-
able uncertainty regarding any assessment of the adequacy of saving. Per-
haps surprisingly, however, we find that a 30 percent reduction in social
security benefits, or a stock market decline of 40 percent, would have rela-
tively small effects on the proportion of households whose wealth-earnings
ratios exceed the simulated median ratios. Increased health care costs in
retirement and increases in life span are estimated to have larger effects.
We then compare our findings with other sources of information about
retirement saving. In the fifth section we examine some examples of pop-
ular financial advice, which often recommends that households aim to
replace a certain portion—usually between 65 and 85 percent—of pre-
retirement income in retirement. We show that, under plausible condi-
tions regarding social security, employer-provided pensions, part-time
work during retirement, and other factors, reaching these replacement rates
often does not require much in the way of discretionary financial saving.
68 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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That is, saving “enough” does not necessarily imply that households need
to accumulate very much in the form of financial assets. Thus the common
observation that households on the eve of retirement have low levels of
financial assets is not in itself evidence of systematic undersaving. We also
show that the simulation model generates average replacement rates—
including social security, employer-provided pensions, and asset income—
between 70 and 80 percent of final earnings. This suggests that the popular
financial advice is not inconsistent with rational utility maximization, and
it supports the view that relatively low accumulations of financial savings
can be perfectly consistent with optimizing behavior.
In the sixth section of the paper we examine previous microeconomic
studies. We show that most previous studies that have been interpreted as
showing inadequate household saving can be largely reconciled with our
findings. Some of the differences in interpretation stem from the use of dif-
ferent benchmarks for adequate saving. In particular, no previous study
incorporates the notion that there should be a distribution of optimal
wealth-earnings ratios among observationally equivalent households, and
many do not allow for declining consumption as retired households age.
Other differences stem from different measures of wealth—we argue it is
appropriate to include at least a significant portion of housing wealth in
retirement wealth calculations—and from a variety of other factors.
In the penultimate section we discuss findings from surveys that ask
respondents if they feel well prepared for retirement. We suggest that
although some of the surveys suggest very little retirement preparation, the
survey answers are sometimes difficult to interpret, and many surveys
appear to suggest quite significant amounts of preparation. We conclude
the paper by placing our results in a broader context.
What Is Adequate Saving? 
A number of alternative definitions of adequate saving could be
employed. At the aggregate level, adequate saving might be associated
with the golden-rule level of capital accumulation.5 At the household level,
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 69
5. See Phelps (1961). The golden-rule capital stock level is obtained when the mar-
ginal product of capital, net of depreciation, is equal to the sum of the rate of labor-
augmenting technological change plus the rate of growth of the labor force. 
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adequacy can be defined relative to the proportion of the future elderly
population who will be in or near poverty, or in terms of the living stan-
dards of the future elderly relative to today’s elderly. Each of these defini-
tions is useful and valid for some purposes, but none matches the definition
we employ.
We define a household to be saving adequately if it is accumulating
enough wealth to be able to smooth its marginal utility of consumption
over time in accordance with the optimizing model of consumption
described in the next section. Several features of this definition are worth
emphasizing. First, our definition is model-based and as such will depend
on all of the features of the underlying model. Second, we define adequacy
at the household level. As a result, our definition bears no relation to
golden-rule levels of aggregate capital accumulation, because households
in the model make choices that are conditional on government spending
programs and taxes, which are not relevant considerations in determining
the golden rule. Thus, even if all households are saving optimally, given
government policies, the economy could still be below the golden-rule
level of aggregate capital accumulation. 
Third, our definition is based on comparisons of the marginal utility of
pre- and postretirement consumption (adjusted for family size). As a result,
there is no relation between poverty rates among the elderly and our defi-
nition of adequacy. A household in poverty during its working years and in
retirement may still be considered to be saving adequately by the definition
we employ, if the marginal utility of postretirement consumption is not
high relative to that of preretirement consumption.
Fourth, our definition is different from “saving enough to maintain pre-
retirement living standards in retirement.” The latter requires smoothing of
consumption levels (adjusted for family size) over time, whereas our def-
inition requires smoothing of the discounted marginal utility of consump-
tion over time. Maintaining living standards is a special case of smoothing
the marginal utility of consumption. In theory, our definition could require
either more or less saving than maintaining living standards would.
Our definition is motivated by research controversies regarding whether
households are forward-looking. It corresponds to the definition of ade-
quacy used in most of the literature we review below, and it is a natural
way to examine adequacy from the perspective of economic research.
Some analysts are clearly more prepared than others to assume that
70 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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observed saving behavior is optimal.6 As discussed by Douglas Bernheim,7
lifetime saving choices may be suboptimal. Many types of behavior can be
optimized gradually through a trial-and-error approach. In contrast, people
proceed through the life cycle only once and do not have the opportunity
to replay their saving history. Moreover, there is no market or feedback
mechanism to punish suboptimal saving behavior before retirement.
Finally, retirement saving choices can be very complex, especially in the
presence of realistic types of uncertainty. Bernheim concludes, “It would
be astonishing if the average individual, with no practice and little or no
training, could on his first try act as if he was a perfectly rational, far-
sighted utility maximizer.”8
Our analysis takes these concerns seriously. We do not assume that
observed saving behavior is optimal. Rather, we simulate optimal behavior
with the model and then compare the model results with actual wealth
accumulation patterns. Thus, whereas in most other contexts deviations
between a model and the data indicate that the model is flawed, we will
interpret any shortfall of actual wealth relative to the model’s wealth pat-
terns as evidence that behavior is flawed, that is, that actual saving is too
low. This assessment, of course, is subject to any qualifications about fea-
tures of the model that do not accurately capture the full set of incentives
and opportunities facing households.
However, our results will speak only to whether the observed levels of
wealth are consistent with the patterns of an optimizing model. They can-
not in any way prove that people are actually solving the optimization
problem defined in the simulation model. Nor do the results speak to sev-
eral important related issues, such as whether social security or pensions
are responsible for observed levels of wealth accumulation, or whether
higher saving would raise households’ or national welfare. As a result,
the policy implications of our findings may not be direct or obvious. In
particular, we make no claim that attaining our definition of adequacy is
the most appropriate goal for retirement income policy. For example, if it
were determined that workers are saving inadequately by our definition,
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6. See, for example, Lazear (1994) and the comments by Bernheim (1994a) and Skinner
(1994).
7. Bernheim (1994a).
8. Bernheim (1994a, p. 172).
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but that the shortfall is small, society might well decide that there are more
pressing uses of limited public resources than raising the living standards
of future retirees.
Modeling the Adequacy of Saving
This section describes the model used to produce benchmarks for ade-
quate saving. After discussing the underlying structure and base-case pa-
rameter specifications, we examine the model’s implications for optimal
wealth accumulation and consumption over the life cycle.
A Stochastic Life-Cycle Model of Saving
Appendix A describes the model in detail.9 Here we summarize the
main features.
OVERVIEW. Households enter the model with two adults aged twenty-
one.10 One child is added at age twenty-five and a second at age twenty-
eight. Each child leaves the home at age twenty-one.11 Families are not
linked across generations. Each adult faces an age-varying probability of
dying, with a maximum life span of 110 years. Each year, the assets of
those who die are bequeathed to members of the generation that is then
forty-five years old. The bequests are distributed in accordance with the
wealth distribution of these forty-five-year-olds, thus capturing the empir-
ically established tendency of wealthier households to receive larger inher-
itances.12 The inheritance is assumed to be unanticipated.
In each period, forward-looking households maximize expected life-
time utility by choosing total consumption (consumption per capita times
the number of people in the household) and total saving subject to a life-
time budget constraint, nonnegativity constraints on net assets, income and
payroll taxes, and uncertainty regarding future earnings, life span, and
inheritances. There are no markets for insurance against these uncertain-
72 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
9. See also Engen (1993b); Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994); Engen and Gale (1996).
10. The model developed in this paper examines married couples because our empiri-
cal analysis is focused on couples.
11. To smooth the effects of children entering and leaving the households, we allow
each transition to occur on a pro rata basis over four years. 
12. Gale and Scholz (1994).
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ties. Because there is a positive probability of death at each age, borrowing
against the uncertain portion of future income and inheritances is not
permitted.
Utility is separable over time, and separable within a time period
between consumption and leisure. The utility function for consumption
exhibits constant relative risk aversion, a constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and constant prudence, which implies that risky income
and uncertain life spans lead to precautionary saving. Thus households
save for retirement and as a precaution against downturns in future income
and the possibility of outliving assets once retired.
Before retirement, consumption may be financed by labor earnings,
decumulations of previously accumulated assets, or inheritances received.
After retirement, consumption is financed by assets accumulated earlier,
which are fully taxable, and by annuity income from social security and
private DB pensions. Labor supply is exogenous and retirement occurs at
a predetermined age. Household earnings are modeled as the sum of a
stochastic component and a nonstochastic component. The latter follows
a hump-shaped pattern with respect to age and varies by education class.
Because the model does not have a closed-form solution, and the ana-
lytical solution would be intractable, we use a numerical solution method
to solve households’ consumption-saving problem. Earnings shocks over
the life cycle are simulated with a random number generator for each of
10,000 households. Because households receive different earnings shocks,
they end up with different realized income, consumption, saving, and
wealth. 
PARAMETER VALUES. The model requires specification of numerous
parameter values. We highlight the most important specification issues
here. Appendix B contains additional details.
Mortality risk. The conditional survival probabilities—the probability
of living to age t + 1 conditional on being alive at age t—used in the model
are calculated as one minus the estimated conditional mortality probabil-
ity. Mortality probabilities for males and females are based on estimates
from the life tables for 1994 used by the Social Security Administration.13
Conditional survival probabilities for each sex are shown in figure 1 up to
age 110, the maximum life span in the model (an individual in the model
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 73
13. U.S. Social Security Administration (1997).
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Figure 1. Conditional Survival Probabilities by Sexa
Percent
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
95
85
75
65
55
Age
Males
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
95
85
75
65
55
Females
Age
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Social Security Administration (1997).
a. Probabilities are calculated as one minus the Social Security Administration’s estimated conditional mortality probability.
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dies with certainty after age 110). For males that have lived to age fifty, for
example, the probability of living to age fifty-one is 99.4 percent; that for
females is 99.6 percent. By age sixty-five these one-year survival proba-
bilities drop to 97.6 and 98.7 percent, respectively, and they decline further
to 92 and 95 percent at age eighty. By age ninety-five, the one-year sur-
vival probabilities are 74 percent for a male and 79 percent for a female.
Life expectancy at age twenty-one is seventy-four years for males and
eighty years for females.
Retirement age. We specify a retirement age of sixty-two years in the
base case. Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber show that 50 percent or
more of men and women are out of the labor force by that age.14
Age-earnings profiles. Because saving is the difference between
income (which before retirement consists largely of labor earnings) and
consumption, the specification of the age-earnings profile is an important
determinant of optimal saving patterns. To estimate the mean age-earnings
profile, we use panel data on earnings of employed heads of households
and their spouses from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, conducted
by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, from 1980
to 1992. We exclude the self-employed and households where the house-
hold head is over sixty-five years old. We estimate a fixed-effects model
with the logarithm of earnings as a function of age, age squared, and year
dummies to control for macroeconomic effects (that is, aggregate wage
growth; table 1 reports the regression results). Separate equations were
estimated for household heads with sixteen or more years of education and
for those with less education. Earnings for the group with more education
are always higher, rise and fall more steeply, and peak at later ages than for
the group with less education (figure 2). The wages of all age groups are
assumed to rise by 1 percent per year to reflect aggregate growth in the
economy. These age-earnings profiles are generally similar to those used
by other researchers.15
Earnings shocks. Available empirical evidence suggests that individu-
als face substantial uncertainty in their labor earnings, and that the largest
share of the variance is idiosyncratic to households rather than stemming
from common aggregate shocks (that is, the business cycle). In a previ-
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 75
14. Diamond and Gruber (1999, figure 11.6).
15. For example, Carroll (1997a); Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Laibson,
Reppetto, and Tobacman (1998).
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ous study, because of concern that measurement error in self-reported
earnings might overstate the variation in actual earnings, Eric Engen used
data from the Internal Revenue Service–Michigan tax panel to estimate the
stochastic process for the logarithm of earnings variations.16 Measure-
ment error is less of a problem with earnings data collected from Internal
Revenue Service W-2 forms filed with income tax returns, because wages
are directly reported by employers, who are required and have the incen-
tive to keep accurate records of earnings paid. Based on that analysis, we
model the stochastic process for labor earnings shocks as a first-order
autoregressive process with a persistence parameter of 0.85 and a vari-
ance of 0.05. Under this specification, about half of a given shock to earn-
ings remains after five years.17 Also, this specification for earnings shocks
implies a variance of log earnings equal to 0.18 (calculated as the vari-
ance of earnings shocks divided by one minus the square of the persistence
parameter: 0.05/[1 – 0.852]) and a covariance of log earnings one year
76 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
Table 1. Estimated Age-Earnings Profiles
Years of education
<16 ≥16
Regression estimates of earnings from labora
Constant 7.906 6.850
Coefficient on age 0.105 0.165
Coefficient on age squared –0.0012 –0.0017
Peak earnings
As percentage of earnings at age 25 184 326
As percentage of earnings at age 62 128 123
Age at which earnings peak 48 52
Replacement rate as a percentage of final earnings
Social security only 35 21
Social security and private defined benefit pension 64 57
Source: Authors’ estimates based on regressions using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.
a. The regressions relate the log of real earnings of the household head and spouse to a household fixed effect, age, age squared,
and year dummy variables. The sample consists of households where the head is employed (but not self-employed) and is between
the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four. The data cover the 1980–92 period.
16. Engen (1993b). 
17. This specification for earnings shocks is similar to that of Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1995) and generates less variation in earnings than the random walk process speci-
fied in Zeldes (1989a) and Carroll (1997a).
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Figure 2. Estimated Age-Earnings Profiles by Pension Statusa
Index, 1 = earnings at age 21
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
Without private pension
With private pension
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
Age
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
Age
Education:
≥ 16 years
< 16 years
Education:
≥ 16 years
< 16 years
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, as described in the text.
a. Specified as in table 1.
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apart equal to 0.15 (the persistence parameter multiplied by the variance:
0.85 × 0.18).18
Income and payroll taxes. We impose a progressive income tax struc-
ture, similar to the actual U.S. system in 1998, with statutory marginal
rates of 15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent, and 39.6 percent.
The taxable income brackets, in dollars, are those effective in 1998 for
joint tax filers. Households are allowed a standard deduction of $7,100
and an exemption of $2,650 for each person. To capture the effect of pref-
erential capital gains tax rates and tax-preferred saving vehicles, without
introducing the substantial complication of explicitly modeling tax-
favored saving, tax rates on capital income are capped at 20 percent. The
social security payroll tax is modeled by taxing labor earnings up to a
limit of $68,400 at a 6.2 percent rate—the employee share of the pay-
roll tax.19
After-tax real rate of return. The only asset in the model has a riskless
return. Nevertheless, we do not feel it is appropriate to use empirical val-
ues of the risk-free rate in the simulation. In the model, the interest rate has
two roles: it affects the growth of consumption and the overall return on
saving. If the model had a safe asset and risky assets, the Euler equation
for optimal consumption growth would be determined by the return on
the safe asset,20 and the overall return on saving would be a weighted
average of these assets.21 The real risk-free rate of return on short-term
Treasury bills has averaged about 1 percent historically. Longer-term gov-
ernment and corporate bonds have yielded about 2 percent in real terms,
and the equity market about 9 percent, in the postwar period.22 A market-
weighted basket of these returns gives a real return of about 5 percent. To
capture the dual roles played by a single asset return in the model, we
take a midpoint of the historical real risk-free rate of return and a mix of all
78 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
18. These generate less variation in earnings shocks than in MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd
and Card (1987, 1989). See Engen (1993b) for further discussion of the estimation of the
earnings shock parameters and how they compare with other studies of earnings variation.
19. We assume that employees bear the full burden of the payroll tax, and therefore
reported earnings have already been reduced by the employer share of the payroll tax. 
20. See, for example, Kocherlakota (1996).
21. See, for example, Zeldes (1989b).
22. See, for example, Cochrane (1998).
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returns, and thus use an average after-tax real rate of return of 3 percent
(the average tax rate on capital income is used here).23
Coefficient of relative risk aversion. We use a base-case value of 3 for
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which implies a value of 0.33 for
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and is based on empirical esti-
mates of the model.24 This value is within the range of estimated values for
risk aversion and intertemporal substitution from aggregate and micro-
economic studies.25 It is also similar to the risk aversion and intertem-
poral substitution values used in other simulations.26
Replacement rates of social security and defined benefit pensions. The
model assumes that each household receives social security and pension
benefits that are based on features of the average age-earnings profile of its
education class, not on its actual wage profile. For example, among house-
holds without pensions, social security is assumed to replace 35 percent of
average final earnings for those with less than sixteen years of education,
and 21 percent of average final earnings for those with sixteen or more
years of education. For households with both pensions and social secu-
rity, the replacement rates of the two combined are 64 percent and 57 per-
cent of final earnings for the two education groups, respectively. These
values are based on pension data from the HRS and social security data
from actual beneficiaries, as described in appendix B.27 Real private DB
pension benefits are assumed to decline by 1 percent per year.
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 79
23. This rate of return is equivalent to that used in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995),
and somewhat lower than the 5 percent (before-tax) rate of return used in Laibson, Reppetto,
and Tobacman (1998). Many other simulation studies have used a rate of return in the
3 to 5 percent range. Carroll (1997a) and Bernheim and Scholz (1993), however, used a risk-
free rate of return.
24. Engen (1993a).
25. See Barsky and others (1997) and Deaton (1992) for discussions of other estimates.
There is little empirical consensus on the value of the risk aversion coefficient, as esti-
mates range from 1 to the very large double-digit values implied by the asset pricing litera-
ture. However, the equity premium has generally been considered a puzzle, because
economists have typically assumed that a risk aversion coefficient greater than around 5
seems inconsistent with other observed behavior regarding risk (see Cochrane, 1998).
26. See, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987); Carroll (1997a); Hubbard, Skin-
ner, and Zeldes (1995); Laibson, Reppetto, and Tobacman (1998).
27. These replacement rates appear to be generally comparable to or lower than those
used in Carroll (1997a); Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Laibson, Reppetto, and
Tobacman (1998). 
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Time preference rates. Specifying the appropriate time preference rate
is difficult but crucial. The goal of the model is to describe optimal (and,
implicitly, time-consistent) behavior, rather than actual behavior. As a
result, choosing the rate so that the model is well calibrated with house-
hold wealth data, or using estimates of time preference rates from previous
empirical studies, would inappropriately impose the assumption that
households’ actual behavior was optimal. Basing the choice on time pref-
erence rates used in other simulation models would also be misleading,
since most of these models aim to explain actual behavior.
An alternative is to examine respondents’ responses to survey questions
about their most desired consumption profiles, but this creates problems.
First, the choices are typically hypothetical or involve only small amounts
of money. Under these circumstances there is no reason to believe that
respondents’ answers are more representative of their true preferences than
their actions are.28 Second, we show below (figure 6) that consumption
profiles that look similar can nevertheless be based on very different time
preference rates.29
Faced with these constraints, we choose two values for the time pref-
erence rate: the average after-tax real interest rate (3 percent) and zero.
Setting the time preference rate equal to the real average after-tax rate of
return is a natural benchmark. It implies that, holding family size con-
stant and setting mortality risk equal to zero, the household facing the
average marginal tax rate would equate the marginal utility of consump-
tion across each period of its existence. This is consistent with the basic
notion of consumption smoothing (technically, marginal utility smoothing)
that is central to dynamic optimization models. A time preference rate of
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28. It is unclear whether the surveys are eliciting answers about respondents’ true pref-
erences, or what respondents wish their true preferences to be. If the latter, it is also unclear
what to do with the information. For example, if high school–educated adults in a household
indicate that they would prefer to have a college education, it would be difficult to justify
modeling them in the simulation as having a college education. Likewise, it is difficult to
decide on a true time preference rate for a household that says its time preference rate is
one value but acts as if it is a different value. Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide a model
of how individuals can invest in future-oriented capital and thus alter their time preference
rates.
29. In particular, with nonstochastic earnings and life span, the slope of the consump-
tion profile will be directly related to the difference between the interest rate and the time
preference rate. With uncertainty, however, this need not occur. Upward-sloping consump-
tion profiles during the working years can result from time preference rates larger than,
equal to, or less than the interest rate.
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3 percent is lower than previous empirical estimates based on consumption
and saving behavior.30 It is also low compared with values often used in
previous simulation studies. We emphasize, however, that this value was
chosen because it sets the after-tax interest rate equal to the time prefer-
ence rate, not because it necessarily corresponds with observed behavior.
As a still lower alternative, it is plausible to consider a time preference
rate of zero as another benchmark. If the household is thought of as a plan-
ner designing its own age-consumption profile, it may make sense not to
value consumption in any period over consumption in any other period.
There are, however, some problems with using a zero time preference rate.
With no borrowing constraints, no uncertainty, and a 3 percent real after-
tax rate of return on its assets, the amount of consumption that the house-
hold would like to defer is huge. The household would choose to consume
so little when young that the marginal utility of consumption at age
twenty-five would be almost six times that at age eighty-five.31 With a con-
stant relative risk aversion utility function and an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of one-third, as in our simulation, the consumption level at
age eighty-five would be 81 percent higher than at age twenty-five (in the
absence of productivity growth and holding family size constant). Even
during middle age, the household would face significantly depressed con-
sumption relative to old age. The marginal utility of consumption at age
forty-five would be more than three times as high as the marginal utility
at age eighty-five, and consumption would be 48 percent higher at age
eighty-five than at age forty-five. Thus we view a zero time preference rate
as assuming that households are extremely patient.
It would be possible to consider other rates, of course. However, with
higher rates of time preference, undersaving would be less of a problem
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30. See Dynan (1993); Engen (1993a); Lawrance (1991); Samwick (1998). Studies of
household durables purchases have yielded a wide variety of estimated time preference
rates. See Hausman (1979); Gately (1980); Hassett and Metcalf (1995).
31. With discrete time periods and no uncertainty, the Euler equation linking marginal
utility over time equates the marginal utility of consumption at age twenty-five with the mar-
ginal utility of consumption at age eighty-five multiplied by a factor equal to one plus the
interest rate divided by one plus the time preference rate, all raised to the 60th power:
U'(C25) = {([1 + r]/[1 + δ])(85–25)}U'(C85),
where U'(Ci) is the marginal utility of consumption at age i, for i = 25, 85. With r = 0.03
and δ = 0, the term in brackets equals 5.89. 
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than reported below. We also considered using a negative time preference
rate but rejected the idea for reasons discussed in appendix B.
Model Results
We begin by reporting results in terms of the ratio of current wealth to
current earnings.32 This is done to normalize the results with respect to
changes in productivity and inflation over time and for ease of compari-
son with some previous studies.33 The wealth measure excludes the present
value of social security and DB pension benefits, to facilitate compar-
isons with the empirical results presented later. Because variations in the
time preference rate proved to be important determinants of the results, we
present findings using both time preference rates specified above.
MEDIAN WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. Optimal wealth-earnings ratios
will evolve differently for different households for two reasons. The first is
that households differ by education status and private pension coverage.
Differences in education affect the level and shape of the age-earnings pro-
file. Differences in pension coverage affect retirement income. These fac-
tors have been included in other studies.
The top panel of table 2 reports median optimal wealth-earnings ratios
for households classified by age, education, and pension status, assuming
a time preference rate of 3 percent. Simulated optimal wealth-earnings
ratios rise over the life cycle. When education status is controlled for,
households with pensions have lower optimal wealth-earnings ratios than
those without, because pensions provide retirement income. When pension
status is controlled for, college graduates have lower optimal wealth-
earnings ratios when young and almost equal or higher ratios when old
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32. In previous work we have shown that, parameterized to represent actual behavior,
the model generates plausible wealth-income ratios, saving elasticities, and aggregate sav-
ing rates (Engen, 1993b; Engen and Gale, 1996). At the household level, consumption tracks
income more closely in this model than in certainty models, and simulated consumption is
more sensitive to income shocks in this model than in a certainty-equivalent model. These
are well-documented features of actual consumption and saving data (Engen, 1993b). Both
the model results and the subsequent data analysis focus on before-tax values of wealth
and earnings.
33. Despite our reporting the results this way, our model should not be confused with a
“buffer stock” or target saving model (see Carroll, 1992). In our model, as already noted,
households save both for retirement and as a precaution against uncertain income and life
span.
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than do other households. This reflects the steeper and later-peaking earn-
ings profiles of college graduates than of other households.
The median wealth-earnings ratios in table 2 are significantly higher
than similar targets calculated by Bernheim and John Karl Scholz.34 For
households in their sixties, our median wealth-earnings ratio exceeds the
Bernheim-Scholz target by about 45 percent for households without pen-
sions, by 37 percent for non-college-educated households with pensions,
and by 12 percent for college-educated households with pensions (see
appendix table D1). The higher values in our model arise from the exis-
tence of precautionary saving, the earlier retirement age (sixty-two as
opposed to sixty-five years), and other factors. Thus we believe that the
basic model with a 3 percent time preference rate provides a conservative
basis on which to judge the adequacy of saving. 
When the time preference rate is assumed to be zero (bottom panel of
table 2), several changes occur. Naturally, the median wealth-earning
ratios are higher in this case, and the change is substantial. By ages sixty
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Table 2. Median Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Age, Education,
and Pension Status
Education <16 years Education ≥ 16 years
Age No pension Pension No pension Pension
Time preference rate = 3 percent
30–34 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.06
35–39 0.56 0.46 0.20 0.14
40–44 1.08 0.83 0.62 0.35
45–49 1.84 1.36 1.39 0.78
50–54 2.70 1.97 2.40 1.39
55–59 3.76 2.66 3.67 2.19
60–62 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
Time preference rate = 0
30–34 0.57 0.46 0.14 0.10
35–39 1.19 0.94 0.52 0.31
40–44 2.00 1.60 1.24 0.76
45–49 3.00 2.42 2.23 1.48
50–54 4.10 3.32 3.41 2.35
55–59 5.24 4.30 4.82 3.39
60–62 6.47 5.16 6.20 4.37
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
34. Bernheim and Scholz (1993).
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to sixty-two, the median wealth-earnings ratios are greater by between
26 percent and 57 percent, depending on the specification of education and
pension status. When education is controlled for, the change in time pref-
erence raises the ratios for households with pensions by a larger propor-
tionate amount than for households without pensions. When pension status
is controlled for, the lower time preference rate raises wealth-earnings
ratios more for those with fewer years of education. For households in
their sixties, the wealth-earnings ratios with a time preference rate of zero
range between 170 and 215 percent of the Bernheim-Scholz targets. 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. The second reason why
wealth-earnings ratios vary across households is distinct to our methodol-
ogy: households receive different earnings shocks over time and at a given
point in time. As a result, households that are observationally equivalent in
the data—that is, that are identical with respect to age, current earnings,
family size, life expectancy, education, and pension status—will have dif-
ferent optimal wealth-earnings ratios.
Table 3 shows the importance of heterogeneous earnings shocks in gen-
erating a distribution of wealth-earnings ratios. The table focuses on col-
lege graduates with pensions. (Appendix tables D2 through D4 report
similar results for other households.) For these households, with a time
preference rate of 3 percent, wealth-earnings ratios among thirty-five- to
thirty-nine-year-olds vary by a factor of 100, from 0.01 at the 5th per-
centile to 1.02 at the 95th percentile. Among sixty- to sixty-two-year-
olds, wealth-earnings ratios vary by a factor of almost 20, from 0.37 at
the 5th percentile to 7.05 at the 95th percentile.
With a time preference rate of zero, the range is almost as significant,
with the optimal ratios varying by a factor of 160 among thirty-five- to
thirty-nine-year-olds and a factor of 7 among sixty- to sixty-two-year-olds.
Reducing the time preference rate to zero raises the optimal wealth-
earnings ratio at ages sixty to sixty-two by between 0.9 and 1.7 at the var-
ious percentile points marked in the table. The ratio rises by 243 percent at
the 5th percentile, 50 percent at the median, and 26 percent at the 95th per-
centile. For this age group, the ratio at the 25th percentile of the wealth-
earnings distribution with a time preference rate of zero (2.94) roughly
equals the ratio at the median of the distribution with a time preference rate
of 3 percent (2.92).
Several features of these results merit comment. Most important, these
observed ratios represent households’ optimal responses to the pattern of
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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earnings shocks they receive. The low wealth accumulation exhibited by
a significant minority of households in the simulation model is consistent
with optimizing behavior and in no way implies a retirement saving short-
fall owing to myopia, irrationality, or poor information.
Moreover, the wide variation is not owing to differences in current earn-
ings. Table 4 shows the distribution of simulated wealth-earnings ratios
by current earnings quintile among college-educated households with pen-
sions for two age groups: those aged fifty to fifty-four and those aged sixty
to sixty-two. Appendix tables D5 through D7 show results for other house-
holds in these age groups. Even within relatively narrow earnings bands,
the variation in optimal wealth-earnings ratios is substantial. In the fourth
earnings quintile in table 4, for example, the optimal ratios vary between
the 5th and 95th percentiles by a factor of 13 for fifty- to fifty-four-year-
olds and by a factor of 8 for sixty- to sixty-two-year-olds.
OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH PROFILES. Figures 3 and 4 dis-
play model results for optimal median consumption per adult equivalent as
a function of age, education, and pension status. By focusing on con-
sumption per adult equivalent rather than on total household consumption,
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Table 3. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Age Among
Households with Sixteen or More Years of Education and with Private Pensions
5th 25th 75th 95th
Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Time preference rate = 3 percent
30–34 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.52
35–39 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.39 1.02
40–44 0.01 0.11 0.35 0.81 1.82
45–49 0.04 0.31 0.78 1.48 2.94
50–54 0.12 0.69 1.39 2.35 4.15
55–59 0.29 1.22 2.19 3.41 5.77
60–62 0.37 1.68 2.92 4.35 7.05
Time preference rate = 0
30–34 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.29 0.82
35–39 0.01 0.08 0.31 0.72 1.63
40–44 0.03 0.29 0.76 1.44 2.75
45–49 0.13 0.76 1.48 2.38 4.19
50–54 0.43 1.44 2.35 3.50 5.62
55–59 0.89 2.25 3.39 4.86 7.47
60–62 1.27 2.94 4.37 6.05 8.88
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
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the figures remove any impact of changes in family size on the consump-
tion profile. For each profile the data are normalized so that consumption
at age twenty-one is equal to 1. Figure 3 reports the results of using a
3 percent time preference rate; figure 4 uses a time preference rate of
zero. For either time preference rate, households with a private pension
have higher lifetime consumption, holding education status constant,
because the pension gives them greater lifetime wealth. When pension sta-
tus is held constant, those with greater education have higher lifetime
consumption paths because they have greater human capital (as reflected
in higher lifetime wages).
The model implies hump-shaped consumption profiles—rising when
young, peaking before retirement, and then generally falling throughout
old age—regardless of education or pension status. Consumption is low
when households are young (even when the real rate of return on assets is
equal to the time preference rate), because households desire to build up
their precautionary saving. As households age, income and wealth rise,
some income uncertainty is resolved, and the precautionary motive for
saving edges off; all these factors lead to rising consumption during the
working years. Consumption declines in old age as an increasing mortality
probability effectively makes households less patient and less willing to
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Table 4. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Current 
Earnings Among Households with Sixteen or More Years of Education 
and with Private Pensionsa
Earnings 5th 25th 75th 95th
quintile percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Ages 50–54
Lowest 0.02 0.17 0.74 1.80 4.11
2nd 0.10 0.47 1.10 2.14 4.05
3rd 0.19 0.65 1.28 2.21 3.92
4th 0.30 0.83 1.48 2.34 3.87
Highest 0.49 1.02 1.53 2.25 3.39
Ages 60–62
Lowest 0.10 1.02 2.86 4.95 8.57
2nd 0.35 1.57 3.08 4.80 7.52
3rd 0.50 1.82 3.18 4.66 6.84
4th 0.73 1.84 2.93 4.17 6.20
Highest 0.96 1.89 2.69 3.69 5.28
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
a. These simulations employ a time preference rate of 3 percent.
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Figure 3. Optimal Age-Consumption Profiles by Pension Status with a 
Time Preference Rate of 3 Percenta
Index, 1 = consumption at age 21
Source: Authors’ calculations using the stochastic life-cycle simulation model described in the text.
a. Consumption is per adult equivalent.
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Figure 4. Optimal Age-Consumption Profiles by Pension Status with a 
Time Preference Rate of Zeroa
Index, 1 = consumption at age 21
Without private pension
With private pension
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
Age
50 60 70 11080 90 10020 30 40
Age
Education:
≥ 16 years
< 16 years
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≥ 16 years
< 16 years4
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1
Source: Authors’ calculations using the stochastic life-cycle simulation model described in the text.
a. Consumption is per adult equivalent.
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defer consumption to an uncertain future. Hump-shaped consumption pro-
files like those in figures 3 and 4 are consistent with observed age-
consumption patterns of households.35
When the time preference rate is zero rather than 3 percent, the con-
sumption profile peaks at a later age, because households are more patient
and thus willing to defer more consumption. However, the general pat-
tern of consumption is similar with either time preference rate.
If household members live long enough, optimal behavior in this model,
which includes annuity income from social security and in some cases a
private pension, suggests that the household should at some time optimally
deplete its financial wealth and rely solely on annuity income to finance
consumption in late old age.36 This can be seen in figures 3 and 4 where
consumption flattens out some time after age ninety. This depletion of
nonannuity wealth is even more evident in figure 5, which shows the
median age-wealth profiles corresponding to a time preference rate of 3
percent.37 In the cases shown, it is optimal to deplete all nonannuity wealth
by about age ninety to ninety-five.
Lastly, it is important to note that the presence of earnings uncertainty,
as in our model, has important implications for the relation between the
time preference rate and the slope of the age-consumption profile. With
no uncertainty, the slope of the age-consumption profile is uniquely deter-
mined by the difference between the time preference rate and the interest
rate. For example, the top panel of figure 6 shows—in a nonstochastic
model with an interest rate of 3 percent—that with a time preference rate
of zero, consumption rises over the life cycle; with a time preference rate
of 3 percent, consumption is flat; and with a time preference rate of 6 per-
cent, consumption falls over the entire life cycle.
In a stochastic model, however, there is a much looser link between
the slope of the age-consumption profile and the difference between the
time preference rate and the interest rate. The bottom panel of figure 6
shows optimal age-consumption profiles for the same three time prefer-
ence rates, but with stochastic earnings and uncertain life span. All three
consumption profiles rise through the working years at roughly the same
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 89
35. See, for example, Attanasio (1993). 
36. Leung (1994).
37. To be clear, these are household wealth profiles and thus are based on household
consumption profiles.
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Figure 5. Optimal Age-Wealth Profiles by Pension Status with a 
Time Preference Rate of 3 Percenta
Thousands of dollars
Source: Authors’ calculations using the stochastic life-cycle simulation model described in the text.
a. Wealth is nonannuity wealth for the median household.
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Index, 1 = consumption at age 21 with a time preference of 3 percent
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Figure 6. Nonstochastic and Stochastic Optimal Age-Consumption Profiles for
Households with Sixteen or More Years of Educationa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. A real interest rate of 3 percent is assumed.
b. Assumes an expected life span of seventy-four.
c. Assumes a maximum life span of 110 years.
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rate, despite the fact that the time preference rates straddle the interest
rate and differ by a total of 6 percentage points. This implies that, in the
real world, it is not possible to infer a household’s time preference rate
(or the difference between its time preference rate and the interest rate)
from its choice of an upward-sloping consumption profile over a flat or
downward-sloping one.
Empirical Analysis
Data Issues
Our analyses use data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey and
the 1983, 1989, 1992, and 1995 Surveys of Consumer Finances. The HRS
is conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan. In 1992 the survey gathered data on a nationally representative
sample of persons born in 1931 to 1941 and on their spouses regardless
of age. Reinterviews have occurred every two years since then. The survey
oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents and contains detailed
information on wealth, pensions, income, employment, demographics, and
health. Our HRS sample consists of the 2,626 married households where
the husband was born between 1931 and 1941 and worked at least twenty
hours per week in the 1992 survey.38
The SCF is a triennial survey undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board
with the cooperation of the Department of the Treasury. The survey over-
samples high-income households and is designed to provide detailed
information on family balance sheets, pension status, income, and demo-
graphics. We use data for married households where the husband is
between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-two and works at least twenty
hours per week. This generates sample sizes between 1,300 and 1,800 in
each year.39
All of our results using both data sets are weighted in accordance with
a nationally representative population. Sample sizes in subgroups of each
data set stratified by age, education, and pension status are reported in
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38. Background information on the HRS is provided in Juster and Suzman (1995).
39. For discussion of the SCF see Avery, Elliehausen, and Canner (1984a, 1984b) and
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden (1997).
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appendix table D8. It is worth keeping in mind throughout the discussion
of the empirical results that some of the sample sizes are small.
BASIC WEALTH AND EARNINGS MEASURES. To measure earnings we use
the sum of current earnings by husband and wife. Measuring wealth is
more complicated. Because the simulation model accounts for both pre-
cautionary saving and saving for retirement, our empirical wealth measure
needs to be broad enough to account for both. We define three measures
of wealth. What we call broad wealth is essentially all net worth other than
equity in vehicles. Specifically, broad wealth is the sum of equity in the
primary residence, other real estate equity, equity in businesses, and net
financial assets; financial assets include balances in DC plans, 401(k)
plans, Individual Retirement Accounts, and Keogh plans as well as non-
tax-advantaged financial assets, less consumer debt. Narrow wealth is
broad wealth less all equity in the primary residence. Intermediate wealth
is broad wealth less half of equity in the primary residence. 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION WEALTH. All of the wealth measures
above exclude social security. The treatment of DB pension wealth, how-
ever, differs in the two data sets. In the SCF, DB pensions are excluded
from the empirical wealth calculations. Households in which at least one
adult has a DB pension from his or her current job are assumed to receive
pension benefits as estimated in table 1, and their wealth, excluding DB
pensions and social security, is compared with the simulation benchmarks
developed above for households with pension coverage. In effect, this
treatment provides each household that has a DB pension from the cur-
rent job with average DB pension benefits, conditional on education status,
as shown in table 1.40
In the HRS data, however, estimates of expected DB pension benefits
can be generated. We use the additional information provided by the DB
pension wealth data in the HRS and therefore include DB pension wealth
in the empirical wealth measures (see appendix C).41 Thus pension wealth
varies across households that have pensions, even after controlling for edu-
cation status. Because we include DB pensions in wealth, we compare
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40. We somewhat underestimate DB pension coverage for SCF households because
households with DB plans from prior jobs but not on the current job are treated as not hav-
ing DB plan coverage.
41. This approach follows that of Moore and Mitchell (1997) and Gustman and Stein-
meier (1998).
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the resulting wealth measures from the HRS data with the simulation’s
wealth benchmarks above for households that do not have pension cover-
age. We do this to avoid double counting DB pension assets.
HOUSING WEALTH. Whether it is conceptually appropriate to include
housing equity in measures of the adequacy of retirement saving has gen-
erated significant debate. The controversy is heightened by the fact that
housing equity constitutes a large portion of nonpension net worth for
most households. Excluding housing wealth is defended on at least three
grounds: some surveys suggest that people do not like to move when they
are old; others indicate that people do not want to consume housing equity
to finance retirement; and some evidence suggests that younger elderly
households in the 1970s chose not to reduce housing equity.42
Although we do not dispute these findings, we do not believe they sup-
port the view that all housing wealth should be excluded from considera-
tions of retirement income adequacy. Households can extract housing
equity without moving, by means of reverse mortgages. And retirees
would surely like not to have to deplete financial assets in retirement
either, yet those are counted in retirement income calculations; therefore
housing wealth should be counted also.
There are many reasons why housing equity should be included as
retirement wealth even though younger elderly households in the 1970s
chose to retain housing equity. First, it may make sense to consume hous-
ing wealth only after consuming other assets, both because housing wealth
is illiquid and somewhat difficult to tap, and because it is tax-preferred.
The value of a tax-preferred asset relative to a fully taxable asset typi-
cally grows as the asset is held over time, because the advantages of tax
deferral cumulate. If so, studies of the younger elderly may not pick up this
effect. Indeed, other studies indicate that older elderly households do even-
tually consume their housing wealth.43 Second, in the 1970s housing was a
highly profitable investment, and thus people would have tended to invest
more in housing rather than disinvested. In the 1980s and 1990s, as hous-
ing has become a less attractive asset to hold for both demographic and tax
reasons, people may be more willing to extract equity from their houses. 
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42. Venti and Wise (1990) provide evidence on whether households choose to reduce
housing equity. Bernheim (1992, 1994b, 1997) summarizes the case against including hous-
ing equity in measuring the adequacy of retirement saving.
43. Sheiner and Weil (1992); Hurd (1995).
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Third, recent policy changes have eliminated the taxation of the first
$500,000 of capital gains on a house. This may induce more retired people
to sell their homes in the future and allow them to consume some of their
housing wealth, even if they would not have done so in the past.
Fourth, the elderly in the 1970s lived through World War I, the Great
Depression, and World War II, and so may have had different attitudes
toward the importance of maintaining a precautionary stock of wealth.
Baby boomers, in contrast, have been among the major participants in
home equity lending booms in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, determining
whether the current elderly are willing to extract their housing equity
does not resolve whether current generations of workers will be willing
to extract their housing equity when they are old. Rather the question is
whether the baby boomers will behave when they are elderly more like
they themselves did when they were young, or more like the elderly do
today. 
Fifth and most important, housing provides consumption services and
thus represents wealth. Certainly, if a household had a negative housing
equity position, that fact would be relevant to its retirement income secu-
rity. Consider two families, identical in every way except that one owns a
$300,000 house that is fully paid off and the other rents. Ignoring hous-
ing equity would amount to concluding that these two households are
equally well prepared for retirement. But common sense as well as eco-
nomic reasoning indicates that the homeowner would be in much better
shape. 
Finally, it makes sense from a policy perspective to consider housing
wealth. A retired couple that lives in a $300,000 house with no mortgage
and has little cash or financial assets, but refuses to dip into housing equity,
may not be considered to have pressing retirement needs from a social pol-
icy perspective.
For all of these reasons, we believe it is appropriate to include housing
equity in retirement saving calculations. Nevertheless, it may not be appro-
priate to include every dollar of equity, since liquidating housing wealth
through sale or reverse mortgages imposes some transactions costs.
Excluding half of housing wealth—as we do with our intermediate wealth
measure—to account for transactions costs certainly overestimates such
costs. Therefore we believe that our intermediate and broad wealth mea-
sures generate the most reasonable empirical results. Nevertheless, we pre-
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 95
08032—BI/BPEA Engen  12/30/99 11:44 AM  Page 95
sent most of our results for all three wealth measures described above,
which together bound all the possible effects of including housing equity.
SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS. By including only married couples that are
still in the work force, we introduce a potentially important sample selec-
tion bias. As a cohort nears retirement age, it is plausible that the more
prosperous households in the cohort retire earlier rather than later. Thus, as
we examine progressively older households in our data, we may be exam-
ining cross sections that are progressively poorer. To the extent that this
shows up as a decline in the adequacy of saving for older households, the
decline would be spurious.
There is some evidence of such bias. In the HRS the overall wealth—
including pensions from previous jobs—of married couples that are not
in the sample (that is, where the husband does not work full-time) is lower
than that of married couples in the sample for fifty-one- to fifty-four-year-
olds and for fifty-five- to fifty-nine-year-olds. However, among sixty- and
sixty-one-year-olds the relationship is reversed: households that are not
in the labor force have more wealth than do those in the labor force.
Similar evidence arises in the 1992 SCF data. Among college-educated
households aged fifty-five to fifty-nine and sixty to sixty-two with pen-
sions, married couples that are not in the labor force have higher median
broad wealth than do married couples that remain in the labor force. At
younger ages the relationship is reversed. Additional supporting evidence
comes from the fact that, for college-educated households without pen-
sions in our sample, median wealth rises with age through ages fifty-five to
fifty-nine and then falls for those ages sixty to sixty-two. The same pat-
tern occurs for non-college-educated households with pensions. 
All of these results suggest that a disproportionate number of wealthy
households are retiring before age sixty-two. Thus any decline in the mea-
sured adequacy of saving among older working households relative to
younger households may be partly spurious.
Basic Results Using the Health and Retirement Survey
For a household with a given set of observable characteristics, the sim-
ulation model generates a distribution of optimal wealth-earnings ratios,
rather than a single optimal level. This implies that we cannot determine
precisely the optimal wealth-earnings ratio for any particular household.
Instead, we compare the distributions of observed and simulated wealth-
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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earnings data for married households with a given set of characteristics:
age, current earnings, education, and pension status. Thus our strategy for
examining the adequacy of saving focuses mainly on two issues: deter-
mining the proportion of households whose wealth-earnings ratios exceed
the median simulated wealth-earnings ratio for households with the same
characteristics; and comparing wealth-earnings ratios at different per-
centiles of the actual and simulated distributions. Both approaches provide
valuable information, but neither permits us to identify which particular
households are saving adequately or inadequately.44
MEDIAN WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. Table 5 reports the results of com-
paring each HRS household’s wealth-earnings ratio with the median of the
distribution of wealth-earnings ratios from the simulation for households
with the same characteristics. For the full sample, the table shows that, with
a time preference rate of 3 percent, 60.5 percent of households have ratios
of broad wealth to earnings that exceed the median simulated wealth-
earnings ratio for households with the same observable characteristics.
The interpretation of this result depends on the fact that the saving
benchmark is derived from a stochastic rather than a nonstochastic model.
In a nonstochastic model, all households of the same age, current earnings,
education, and pension status would be assigned the same optimal wealth-
earnings ratio, and the finding above would be interpreted as showing
that 60.5 percent of households exceed the optimal ratio. That would mean
that almost 40 percent of households fall short of their assigned optimal
wealth-earnings ratio. This would (erroneously) suggest that a significant
portion of the population is undersaving.
In contrast, once it is recognized that households face uncertainty about
their future earnings, it is appropriate to use a stochastic model as the
benchmark. This in turn implies that one would expect only 50 percent of
households to exceed the median wealth-earnings ratio. Thus the same
fact—that 60.5 percent of actual households exceed the simulated
median—would instead suggest adequate, indeed somewhat more than
adequate, amounts of wealth accumulation relative to the benchmark at the
median of the distribution. 
For reasons noted above, we believe the most reasonable estimates stem
from using intermediate or broad wealth in the data and a time preference
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 97
44. The identification of exact optimal rates may be facilitated with household panel
data with a history of previous earnings, an analysis we hope to undertake in future work.
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rate of 3 percent in the simulation. Thus our central finding from table 5
is that estimates using that specification show that between 52 and 61 per-
cent of the sample exceed the median wealth-earnings ratio. These results
suggest that households are saving adequately, at least around the median
of the distribution. 
In addition, however, table 5 shows that the treatment of housing wealth
and the choice of time preference rate can have significant effects on the
results. When housing equity is excluded (that is, under the narrow wealth
specification) but the time preference rate of 3 percent is retained, the
proportion of households whose wealth-earnings ratios exceed the median
ratio falls to 43 percent. Reducing the time preference rate to zero also pro-
duces significantly poorer results than in the base case. Nevertheless,
46 percent of households still have broad wealth–earnings ratios that
exceed the median simulated ratios, and 39 percent have intermediate
wealth–earnings ratios that exceed the median simulated ratio. For all
combinations of the two time preference rates and the three treatments of
housing, our results show that between 33 and 60 percent of all households
exceed the median wealth-earnings ratio. We emphasize that all of these
results should be compared against a benchmark expectation that only
50 percent of households will exceed the median.
The table shows several other interesting results as well. When educa-
tion is controlled for, households with pensions appear to be saving sig-
nificantly more adequately than households without pensions. Having a
pension is associated with an increase of about 12 percentage points in
the proportion of households that exceed the median target wealth-
earnings ratio when the time preference rate is 3 percent, and an increase
of about 7 percentage points when the time preference rate is zero. Alter-
natively, when pensions are controlled for, households with more educa-
tion are saving more adequately than are households with less education.
Having more education is associated with a 15- to 25-percentage-point
increase in the likelihood of exceeding the simulated median wealth-
earnings ratio. These qualitative results are consistent with those of numer-
ous previous studies.45 As with previous studies of the adequacy of saving,
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we do not determine whether the results are due to the direct effects of
pensions and education or to unobserved characteristics that affect house-
hold saving and are correlated with pension coverage and education.
The results do not vary significantly with respect to age. The proportion
of households whose wealth-earnings ratios exceed the median simulated
ratio is higher for those with current earnings below $10,000 a year than
it is for households with current earnings between $10,000 and $50,000 a
year. It is highest for households with earnings above $75,000 a year. This
suggests that high-earnings households may have some important differ-
ence in tastes or opportunities for saving compared with others.46
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. Table 6 provides evi-
dence on the distribution of wealth-earnings ratios. The top three panels
report data from the HRS. The bottom two provide simulated wealth-
earnings ratios from the model, using the same distribution of households
across education groups as is found in the HRS and using each of the two
benchmark time preference rates.
In the simulations using a time preference rate of 3 percent, several
results stand out. First, replicating the results in table 5, the median wealth-
earnings ratios in the data exceeds the median in the simulation when
intermediate and broad measures of wealth are used. Second, the model
underestimates wealth-earnings ratios at the high end of the distribution.
That is, there is a significant amount of real-world wealth accumulation
that the model does not include. This may not be particularly surprising,
because the model does not include bequest motives or the possibility of
receiving a very high rate of return, perhaps on an entrepreneurial
investment. 
Third, at the 25th percentile the broad wealth–earnings ratio is almost
exactly equal to the simulated ratio, whereas the intermediate wealth–
earnings ratio falls below the simulated ratio by about 0.4 for fifty-one- to
fifty-four-year-olds, by 0.7 for fifty-five- to fifty-nine-year-olds, and by 0.8
for sixty- to sixty-one-year-olds. Thus there is some evidence of a shortfall
at the 25th percentile. At the 5th percentile, actual wealth-earnings ratios
are far below the simulated optimal ratios. For example, among fifty-five-
100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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to fifty-nine-year-olds, the simulated optimal ratio is 1.2, compared with
a ratio of broad or intermediate wealth to earnings of 0.2.
In summary, we view the results as showing that, with a time preference
rate of 3 percent in the simulation, actual wealth-earnings ratios unam-
biguously fall below the simulated ratios somewhere in the bottom 25 per-
cent of the distribution. This result is consistent with systematic
undersaving in this portion of the sample. It is also consistent, however,
with other explanations that the model does not take into account. In par-
ticular, the model omits any sort of government-provided consumption
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Table 6. Distribution of Actual Wealth-Earnings Ratios of Households in the 1992
Health and Retirement Survey and Simulated Ratiosa
Wealth 5th 25th 75th 95th
measureb Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Actual HRS
Narrow 51–54 –0.04 0.83 2.14 4.93 13.71
55–59 0.00 1.20 3.11 7.17 20.62
60–61 0.06 1.67 3.63 7.42 20.04
Allc 0.00 0.99 2.75 6.29 17.41
Intermediate 51–54 0.08 1.34 2.83 5.95 15.19
55–59 0.19 1.83 3.95 8.03 21.88
60–61 0.49 2.51 4.73 8.58 21.77
All 0.17 1.65 3.59 7.29 19.50
Broad 51–54 0.09 1.79 3.63 6.96 17.07
55–59 0.20 2.50 4.93 8.97 23.54
60–61 0.69 3.17 5.80 9.84 23.50
All 0.23 2.19 4.40 8.37 21.94
Simulation with time preference rate = 3 percent
51–54 0.63 1.75 2.73 3.97 6.25
55–59 1.21 2.55 3.74 5.22 7.89
60–61 1.77 3.27 4.63 6.25 9.13
All 0.96 2.28 3.49 5.03 7.78
Simulation with time preference rate = 0
51–54 1.50 2.84 4.04 5.47 7.99
55–59 2.24 3.82 5.21 6.90 9.76
60–61 2.94 4.68 6.22 8.05 11.08
All 1.92 3.50 4.92 6.68 9.65
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS data.
a. Simulated ratios are weighted to reflect the distribution of households across education groups. As noted in the text, because
DB pensions are included in the empirical HRS wealth measure, the simulated ratios are based on the assumption that no house-
holds have pension coverage.
b. Wealth measures are as defined in table 5.
c. All households aged fifty-one to sixty-one.
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floor.47 We return to this issue when we discuss sensitivity analysis and
extensions below.
Naturally, the results are significantly less encouraging when the data
are compared with the simulation results that use a time preference rate of
zero. As table 5 shows, a majority of the full sample have wealth-earning
ratios below the simulated median. The difference becomes significantly
larger at the 25th and the 5th percentiles (table 6). If one accepts a zero
time preference rate as the correct value, the data suggest that a signifi-
cant portion of the population is undersaving by substantial amounts. 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CORRELATES OF HIGH SAVERS. Table 7 shows
the characteristics of “high savers” and “low savers.” We define high savers
as households whose intermediate wealth–earnings ratios exceed the
median ratio from the simulation using the 3 percent time preference rate,
and low savers as those below the median.48 Before examining these char-
acteristics, it is worth emphasizing that these designations may be mis-
leading. Because the optimal wealth-earnings ratio varies among
observationally equivalent households, there is no way to determine, with
the current data, whether any particular household is actually saving more
than it needs for retirement. It could be that, given its earnings history,
the household has an optimal wealth-earnings ratio that is higher than its
actual ratio, even though its actual ratio exceeds the median ratio for
households with its characteristics. Nevertheless, the typical determinants
of households above and below the median target are of interest.
Table 7 shows that the average high saver household has more wealth
and higher wages than the average low saver. High savers are more likely
to have received an inheritance, and among those who have received an
inheritance, theirs tend to be larger. High savers also have fewer children
living at home; they are more likely to be self-employed, to be college
graduates, and to have pension coverage; and they are less likely to be
nonwhite or Hispanic. High savers are also less likely to smoke and more
likely to say they have thought about retirement “a lot,” and they have
slightly longer financial horizons. They are more likely to believe they will
live to age seventy-five, and they expect to retire earlier than low savers.
102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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Table 7. Characteristics of High and Low Savers in the 
1992 Health and Retirement Surveya
Percent of all respondents except where stated otherwise
Characteristic Low savers High savers
Narrow wealth (dollars)b 41,933 321,294 
Broad wealth (dollars) b 88,350 420,598
Age of household head (years)b 55 56 
Combined wages of head and spouse (dollars) b 41,697 51,172 
No. of children living at home 0.849 0.774
Household head has ≥ 16 years of education 17.2 34.6
Household head is self-employed 20.9 28.4
Household head has pension coverage 52.6 68.3
Either spouse is nonwhite 12.9 5.9
Either spouse is Hispanic 8.2 3.2
Husband is in fair or poor health 12.7 8.5
Wife is in fair or poor health 15.4 10.2
Husband smokes 30.9 17.7
Wife smokes 25.2 17.4
Husband’s relative mortality optimism (age 75) –0.020 0.031
Husband’s mortality optimism index missing 0.102 0.098
Husband certain he will not attain age 75 6.3 3.0
Wife’s relative mortality optimism (age 75) –0.120 –0.065
Wife’s mortality optimism index missing 0.034 0.032
Wife certain she will not attain age 75 4.8 2.2
Expected retirement age (years) 63 62
Expect never to retire 13.9 10.4
Thought about retirement
Hardly at all 21.0 12.4
Little 12.7 10.8
Some 21.2 26.9
A lot 21.9 30.6
No answer 23.3 19.3
Financial horizon
<1 year 12.6 7.1
1–5 years 38.3 39.9
5–10 years 32.4 32.8
≥10 years 6.0 9.9
No answer 10.7 10.3
Risk aversion
Level 1 12.1 9.3
Level 2 10.9 8.2
Level 3 10.1 11.9
Level 4 (most risk averse) 66.8 70.6
Received inheritance 16.6 25.8
Value of inheritance, given receipt (dollars)b 9,000 20,000
Source: Author’s calculations based on 1992 HRS data.
a. A high saver is defined as a household whose intermediate wealth–earnings ratio exceeds the median simulated ratio for
households with the same characteristics, when the simulation model uses a time preference rate of 3 percent. 
b. Values are medians for households with the stated characteristic; values for other characteristics are means. Narrow and broad
wealth are as defined in table 5.
c. The mortality optimism index is the difference between the respondent’s subjective expectation of life expectancy and an
objective measure of that respondent’s life expectancy, as a percentage of the latter.
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Table 8 presents estimates of two probit models of whether a household
is a high saver. Model 1 contains basic household demographic and earn-
ings variables. Model 2 adds indicators for health, inheritances, retirement,
and preferences. The demographic variables largely have effects similar to
previous estimates. Households with college degrees have a higher likeli-
hood of being a high saver, by 14 percentage points. Households that have
pensions or are self-employed have higher likelihoods, by about 20 per-
centage points. Nonwhites and Hispanics have lower likelihoods of being
high savers, by 15 and 9 percentage points, respectively. The only slightly
anomalous finding involves income. The likelihood of being a high saver
is lower for households with higher incomes, when other factors are con-
trolled for. There is no apparent pattern with respect to age.
The added indicators have plausible signs as well. The likelihood of
being a high saver is low for smokers, perhaps because of a higher time
preference rate for those households. The likelihood rises with declines
in expected retirement age, with the extent to which the household has
thought about retirement, and with the household’s financial horizon. It is
also higher for households who have contacted the Social Security Admin-
istration to find out about their benefits, and for households who have
received a large inheritance.
Basic Results Using the Survey of Consumer Finances
Empirical analysis with the SCF data allows consideration of a num-
ber of additional items, because the surveys span a wider age group and a
longer period of time than does the 1992 HRS. For comparability with
the HRS results, we focus first on the 1992 SCF and then examine results
from several years of data.
MEDIAN WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. Table 9 uses the 1992 SCF sample
of married households where the husband is between the ages of twenty-
five and sixty-two and works full-time. The aggregate results are some-
what more favorable than the HRS results. Using a time preference rate
of 3 percent, the proportions of households exceeding the simulated
median wealth-earnings ratio are 66 percent, 60 percent, and 47 percent for
measures using broad, intermediate, and narrow wealth, respectively.
Using a time preference rate of zero, the analogous figures are 54 per-
cent, 46 percent, and 36 percent. Thus between 35 and 66 percent of
households exceed the median wealth-earnings ratio, depending on the
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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Table 8. Probit Regression Results for Households in the 
1992 Health and Retirement Surveya
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Variable estimate probability estimate probability
Age
55–59 0.044 0.018 –0.030 –0.012
60–61 0.033 0.013 –0.017 –0.007
Household income 
$20,000–$30,000 –0.176 –0.070 –0.277** –0.110
$30,000–$40,000 –0.214** –0.085 –0.466*** –0.182
$40,000–$50,000 –0.214** –0.085 –0.443*** –0.173
$50,000–$75,000 –0.035 –0.014 –0.279** –0.111
≥$75,000 –0.024 –0.010 –0.324** –0.128
Children living at home
1 –0.046 –0.018 –0.053 –0.021
2 –0.085 –0.034 –0.042 –0.017
≥3 –0.254** –0.100 –0.156 –0.062
Head of household has 0.484*** 0.190 0.358*** 0.141
≥16 years of education
Either spouse is self-employed 0.472*** 0.186 0.554*** 0.216
Either spouse has pension coverage 0.554*** 0.218 0.527*** 0.208
Household head is nonwhite –0.488*** –0.189 –0.390*** –0.153
Household head is Hispanic –0.288*** –0.113 –0.238** –0.094
Husband in fair or poor health –0.093 –0.037
Wife in fair or poor health –0.111 –0.044
Husband smokes –0.154** –0.061
Wife smokes –0.283*** –0.112
Husband’s relative mortality 0.030 0.012
optimism (age 75)
Husband’s mortality optimism –0.056 –0.022
index missing
Husband certain he will not reach 75 –0.302* –0.119
Wife’s relative mortality optimism 0.132 0.053
(age 75)
Wife’s mortality optimism –0.056 –0.022
index missing
Wife certain she will not reach 75 –0.135 –0.054
Expected retirement age
56–59 0.397** 0.155
60–61 0.437*** 0.170
62 –0.007 –0.003
63–64 –0.061 –0.024
65 –0.429*** –0.168
(continued next page)
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time preference rate and the treatment of housing. Although the two sur-
veys correspond to the same time period, comparing the aggregate SCF
and HRS results is a little misleading, because the two data sets span dif-
ferent age groups.
Table 9 also shows that a higher proportion of younger than of older
SCF households exceed the median wealth-earnings ratios. For fifty- to
sixty-two-year-olds, the SCF data generate about the same results as do the
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
Table 8. Probit Regression Results for Households in the 
1992 Health and Retirement Surveya (continued)
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Variable estimate probability estimate probability
Expected retirement age (continued)
66–69 –0.376*** –0.147
70 –0.338** –0.133
Will never retire 0.204 0.081
Thought about retirement
A little 0.124 0.050
Some 0.209** 0.083
A lot 0.290*** 0.115
Financial horizon (years)
1–5 0.226** 0.090
5–10 0.177* 0.071
≥10 0.386*** 0.151
Risk aversion
Level 2 –0.042 –0.017
Level 3 0.204* 0.081
Level 4 (most averse) 0.081 0.032
Ever contacted Social Security 0.169*** 0.067
Inheritance
<$5,000 –0.284* –0.112
$5,000–$10,000 –0.124 –0.049
$10,000–$25,000 0.053 0.021
$25,000– $100,000 0.461*** 0.179
≥$100,000 0.840*** 0.303
Constant –0.365*** –0.336*
N 2,626 2,378
Source: Authors’ calculations.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
a. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the household’s actual wealth-earnings ratio exceeds the median simulated
wealth-earnings ratio, and zero otherwise.
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HRS data (table 5). In the SCF between 57 and 68 percent of households
in the age groups over fifty had broad wealth–earnings ratios exceeding the
median simulated ratio, using a time preference rate of 3 percent, com-
pared with about 60 percent in the HRS data. Between 43 and 49 percent
of households in the same age group had broad wealth–earnings ratios
exceeding the median simulated ratio with a time preference rate of zero,
compared with a range of 43 to 47 percent in the HRS data.
Like the HRS data, the SCF data show higher proportions of households
with pension coverage and of households with more education exceeding
their simulated median wealth-earnings ratios. The SCF data, like the HRS
data, also show that the proportion of households that exceed the simulated
median ratio is higher for households with very low earnings (less than
$10,000 a year) than for households with low to moderate earnings
($10,000 to $40,000). The proportion exceeding the median wealth-
earnings ratio is also higher for the households in the highest earnings
categories than in slightly lower earnings categories. 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS. Table 10 reports the dis-
tribution of wealth-earnings ratios among fifty-one- to sixty-one-year-olds
in the 1992 SCF and in the simulation model. The model results are gen-
erated by creating an artificial sample with the same proportion of house-
holds by education and pension status that is found among fifty-one- to
sixty-one-year-olds in the 1992 SCF.49 The SCF data show that, with a
time preference rate of 3 percent, the simulation model understates actual
saving at the high end of the wealth-earnings distribution and (for the
broad wealth definition) at the median, which is consistent with the HRS
results.
The SCF data show strong wealth accumulation at the bottom of the
wealth-earnings distribution. The broad wealth–earnings ratio in the SCF
exceeds the simulated ratio at the 25th percentile and at the 5th percentile
of the distribution for fifty-five- to fifty-nine-year-olds and for sixty- and
sixty-one-year-olds. The intermediate wealth–earnings ratio in the SCF
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
49. The weighted simulation results in table 10 are not strictly comparable to those in
table 6. Table 10 uses weights based on households’ college and DB pension status, because
in the SCF data we do not include DB pension wealth in households’ wealth calculation. The
simulation results in table 6 assume that all households do not have a pension—because in
the HRS data, DB pension wealth is included as a component of measured wealth—and sim-
ply weight between the proportion of households with a college education and those
without. 
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falls below the simulated ratio by about 0.5 in these same age groups at the
25th percentile, but is very close to the simulated ratio at the 5th percentile.
In summary, table 10 provides some evidence of undersaving in the SCF
data, but the evidence is hardly conclusive.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH AND LOW SAVERS. In further analysis, the
results of which are not shown, we also examine the characteristics of SCF
households that were high savers and low savers, as defined above. The
data patterns generally parallel the results from the HRS. High savers had
more wealth, income, education, and pension coverage than did low
savers. In addition, 25 percent of high savers expected to receive an inher-
itance, compared with only 16 percent of low savers.
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Table 10. Distribution of Actual Wealth-Earnings Ratios of Households 
in the 1992 Survey of Current Finances and Simulated Ratiosa
Wealth 5th 25th 75th 95th
measureb Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Actual SCF
Narrow 51–54 –0.12 0.14 1.33 4.12 11.94
55–59 0.00 0.77 2.62 5.89 20.45
60–61 0.33 1.19 2.64 6.88 35.79
Allc –0.07 0.55 1.93 5.33 20.46
Intermediate 51–54 –0.07 0.51 1.87 5.05 14.13
55–59 0.62 1.54 3.30 6.69 24.42
60–61 0.98 1.96 3.83 9.05 38.78
All 0.05 1.28 2.78 6.44 21.64
Broad 51–54 –0.04 0.78 2.38 6.00 16.69
55–59 0.99 2.52 4.51 7.62 27.03
60–61 1.22 2.73 4.82 10.09 43.10
All 0.07 1.81 3.53 7.57 23.97
Simulation with time preference rate = 3 percent
51–54 0.42 1.37 2.30 3.50 5.75
55–59 0.69 1.97 3.13 4.58 7.24
60–61 1.08 2.50 3.85 5.46 8.33
All 0.62 1.77 2.92 4.39 7.10
Simulation with time preference rate =0
51–54 1.11 2.42 3.59 5.01 7.52
55–59 1.67 3.25 4.63 6.31 9.20
60–61 2.18 3.96 5.50 7.33 10.43
All 1.44 2.98 4.37 6.08 9.06
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SCF data.
a. Simulated ratios are weighted to reflect the distribution of households across education groups and pension status.
b. Wealth measures are as defined in table 5.
c. All households aged fifty-one to sixty-one.
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CHANGES IN WEALTH-EARNINGS RATIOS OVER TIME. Table 11 reports
the proportion of SCF households whose wealth-earnings ratios exceeded
the simulated median ratio over time. Using the intermediate wealth mea-
sure and a time preference rate of 3 percent, the proportion of households
who exceeded the median simulated wealth-earnings ratio for households
with their characteristics fell slightly from 1983 to 1995 but remained at
58 percent or more in each sample year. Using the broad wealth measure,
the proportion of households that exceeded the median simulated wealth-
earnings ratio fell from 71 percent in 1983 to 66 percent in 1992 and
remained at that level in 1995. With a time preference rate of zero, fewer
households surpassed the median simulated wealth-earnings ratios. Nev-
ertheless, between 44 and 47 percent of households had intermediate
wealth above the median simulated ratio, and over 50 percent had broad
wealth that exceeded the median ratio. Notably, narrow wealth–earnings
ratios rose over the same period, presumably in part because of the large
buildup of financial assets during this period.50 These results indicate that
different measures of the adequacy of saving can move in different direc-
tions over the same time period.
The table also shows how different cohorts have fared over time relative
to their median simulated wealth-earnings ratios. Wealth accumulation
for younger baby boomers (those born between 1956 and 1964) improved
relative to the simulated medians over the 1989–95 period, as they aged
from a range of twenty-five to thirty-three years to thirty-one to thirty-nine
years. Depending on whether a time preference rate of 3 percent or zero
is used, and whether the wealth measure is intermediate or broad, between
50 and 76 percent of younger boomers exceeded the simulated median
wealth ratios in 1995. 
For older boomers (those born between 1946 and 1955), wealth accu-
mulation has not increased as much as the optimal simulated ratios have,
but overall wealth accumulation is still fairly high. Using a time preference
rate of 3 percent, in 1995, when the older boomers were between forty and
forty-nine years old, between 55 and 65 percent of them exceeded the
median wealth-earnings ratios, depending on whether the intermediate or
the broad measure of wealth is used. 
Wealth accumulation among the younger HRS cohort (those born
between 1937 and 1941) fell dramatically relative to the simulated median
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
50. See Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
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wealth-earnings ratios between 1983 and 1995. In contrast, for the older
HRS cohort (those born between 1931 and 1936), wealth accumulation in
1992 was quite strong relative to earlier years and relative to the simu-
lated ratios. In 1992 between 58 and 67 percent exceeded the median ratios
using the intermediate or the broad wealth definition and a 3 percent time
preference rate. Using a zero percent time preference rate and the same
wealth data, between 42 and 52 percent exceeded the median.
These results show that trends in wealth accumulation can vary signifi-
cantly across cohorts. In two of the four cohorts, the proportion of house-
holds that exceeded the median wealth-earnings ratios declined. But in
the other two that proportion rose, and for the one cohort that actually
reached retirement age in the sample years—the older HRS cohort—
observed wealth was higher in 1992 relative to the benchmarks than in
either of the earlier years. Finally, it is worth noting that at least some of
the decline as cohorts near retirement age is probably owing to the sam-
ple selection biases noted earlier.
Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our findings to variations in
model parameter values, retirement wealth estimates, and consumption
needs (table 12). Appendix table D9 shows how selected median simulated
wealth-earnings ratios change across the various sensitivity analyses. We
also explore a number of possible extensions of the underlying model
that might influence the findings.
Sensitivity Analysis
We focus on our preferred specification: simulation results using a
3 percent time preference rate and intermediate and broad definitions of
wealth. For comparison purposes, the first line of table 12 reports base-case
results derived earlier using these specifications, showing the percentage of
households whose wealth-earnings ratios exceed the median simulated
wealth-earnings ratio for households with the same characteristics. 
BASIC MODEL PARAMETERS. Variations in the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) between 0.25 and 0.50 change the proportion of house-
holds exceeding the median wealth-earnings target by between 4 and 8
112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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percentage points (table 12). Raising the real after-tax rate of return on
assets to 5 percent reduces the proportion slightly, but reducing it to 1
percent raises the proportion by 9 percentage points in the HRS data and
6 percentage points in the SCF data. To increase the persistence of a given
earnings shock, we increase the first-order autoregression coefficient to
0.99 (a coefficient of one would correspond to a permanent shock). More-
persistent shocks greatly increase the need for precautionary saving, espe-
cially early in the life cycle. Thus the adequacy of saving declines
significantly in the HRS data, which cover households between the ages of
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Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis: Shares of Households with Wealth-Earnings Ratios At
or Above the Simulated Median Wealth-Earnings Ratio Under Alternative Scenarios
Percent
1992 HRS 1992 SCF
Intermediate Broad Intermediate Broad
Case wealth wealth wealth wealth
Base casea 51.9 60.5 59.7 66.4
Changes to base-case parametersb
Time preference rate = 0 39.3 45.7 46.0 54.0
IES = 0.5 59.2 68.5 65.4 72.0
IES = 0.25 47.9 56.2 54.5 62.1
Persistence parameter = 0.99 40.9 47.6 28.8 35.2
After-tax return = 5 percent 50.0 58.2 55.0 62.1
After-tax return = 1 percent 60.3 69.0 65.6 72.5
Changes to wealth measuresb
Exclude business wealth 48.3 57.3 56.3 63.9
40 percent decline in stock market 49.6 58.8 58.2 65.6
30 percent cut in social security benefits 46.9 55.0 57.3 64.3
Add expected inheritances — — 62.5 68.8
Retire at age 65 57.0 65.9 61.5 68.5
Social security and pensions as function 49.4 57.4 47.9 56.4
of household’s final earnings
Changes to consumption needsb
20 percent increase in all simulated 45.1 53.0 55.7 63.4
wealth-earnings ratios
10 percent increase in survival rates 42.3 50.2 53.6 60.6
Substitution of Bernheim-Scholz targetsb 66.2 73.6 62.5 70.6
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS and SCF data.
a. The parameters of the base case are as follows: time preference rate = 0.03, intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) =
0.33, autoregressive persistence parameter = 0.85, retirement at age sixty-two, a real after-tax rate of return of 3 percent, and social
security and pension income derived from the average final earnings of one’s own education class.
b. Specifications of the sensitivity analysis are described in the text. Wealth measures are as defined in table 5.
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fifty-one and sixty-one, but declines by even larger amounts in the SCF
data, which focus more heavily on younger households. These results
suggest that the basic findings are sensitive to the appropriate specification
of intertemporal substitution, the rate of return, and earnings shocks. How-
ever, for most of these specifications, half or close to half of all households
are still above the simulated median wealth-earnings ratios.
WEALTH MEASURES. The next panel of table 12 explores the impact of
changing the definition or the amount of wealth. For example, equity in a
business may reflect human capital that is specific to the owner. Households
may be unable to cash in such wealth to finance retirement. Excluding all
business wealth from the estimates, however, does not change the results
for households at the median benchmark very much. Only about one-quar-
ter of the HRS households are self-employed, and they tend to have signif-
icantly higher wealth-earnings ratios than average, as shown in table 8. 
To simulate the effects of a substantial decline in the stock market, we
reduce each household’s actual wealth by 40 percent of its stock and
mutual fund holdings and, on the assumption that retirement funds are
divided equally between stocks and other assets, by 20 percent of balances
in DC pensions, Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans, and 401(k)
plans. This has a very small impact on the results for the median house-
hold, presumably because stock holdings are concentrated among the
wealthiest families.51
To simulate possible changes to social security, we reduce benefits by
30 percent, an amount sufficient to restore long-term balance to the social
security system.52 In this scenario the proportion of households whose
broad wealth exceeds the median target falls by 5.5 percentage points in
the HRS sample and by 2.1 percentage points in the SCF sample. Given
the centrality of social security in the retirement income of many elderly
households,53 these effects seem small. However, it is likely that the effects
are larger at the lower end of the wealth-earnings distribution.
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
51. Since 1992, stocks have risen significantly in value, which would make the impact
of a similar decline today even smaller. Stock ownership is also more widespread now than
it was in 1992, and this could increase the impact of a crash on the results reported here,
but stock holdings for the median household are generally small (Kennickell, Starr-
McCluer, and Sunden, 1997).
52. U.S. Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(1999).
53. Aaron and Reischauer (1998).
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Using the SCF data, we assign to each household that expects an inher-
itance a current wealth increment, such that if that increment grew at a real
rate of 3 percent per year, the resulting balance would be $25,000 at age
sixty-five. This addition to wealth has a small effect on the overall results,
raising the proportion of households who exceed the median wealth-
earnings target by 2 to 3 percentage points.
Raising the predetermined retirement age to sixty-five increases lifetime
earnings in the simulations and raises the proportion of households who
exceed the median wealth-earnings ratio by about 5 percentage points in
the HRS data. In the SCF data, most of the households are younger than
fifty, so the impact is smaller.54
Lastly, the base-case model specifies that each household receives
social security and pension income based on the average final earnings of
its education class—taken from the mean age-earnings profile—rather
than based on the household’s actual wage profile. This implies that some
households with very low earnings relative to their education class would
have a very high actual replacement rate and therefore need to save very
little. Likewise, households with very high earnings would have very low
replacement rates relative to their actual earnings and thus must save more.
This generates (inappropriate) variance in wealth and possibly in wealth-
earnings ratios as well. To test the importance of this effect, we redesigned
the model to allow social security and pension income to depend on each
household’s actual final earnings. In effect, this overstates the uncertainty
of pension and social security benefits, because real-world social security
benefits are a function of years of coverage and lifetime average wages,
and real-world benefits from DB plans are often a function of several years
of earnings and years of coverage.
This change increases optimal precautionary saving by substantial
amounts for younger households but only by small amounts for older
households. As a result, the effect of this change was relatively small on
HRS households in their fifties. However, among SCF households aged
twenty-five to sixty-two, the change reduced the proportion exceeding
the median wealth-earnings target by 10 to 12 percentage points.
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54. To analyze retirement at age sixty-five, we raise the pension and social security
replacement rates by 10 percent and allow earnings to continue between ages sixty-two
and sixty-five according to the same age-earnings profile and the same stochastic process
used in the rest of the analysis. 
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CONSUMPTION NEEDS. As a further sensitivity test, we raised all simu-
lated wealth-earnings ratios by 20 percent. This scenario could cover a
number of possibilities. For example, if health care accounts for 10 percent
of household expenditure before retirement, this amounts to tripling health
expenditure in retirement; if preretirement health expenditure is 20 per-
cent, it represents a doubling. Likewise, raising the simulated wealth-
earnings ratios could be a rough way to proxy for uncertainty regarding
health expenses or income in retirement. Although this may not be a worst-
case scenario, a 20 percent increase does reduce the proportion of house-
holds who exceed the simulated median wealth-earnings ratios by 7
percentage points in the HRS data and by less in the SCF data.55
Some observers believe that the assumptions used in the social secu-
rity trustees’ forecasts and in this paper systematically understate the typ-
ical future life span.56 To account for this possibility, we raise survival rates
by 10 percent. This increases life expectancy at birth by about 7.5 years for
men and 8 years for women. The resulting survival rates are higher than
those in the Social Security Administration’s high-cost scenario. This
change has a significant impact on the results, reducing the proportion of
households that exceed the median saving benchmark by 10 percentage
points in the HRS data, and by 6 percentage points in the SCF data. 
BERNHEIM-SCHOLZ TARGETS. Lastly, we examine the impact of using
the simulation benchmarks of Bernheim and Scholz.57 Both the HRS and
the SCF data show very high levels of saving using these targets. Two-
thirds of households in the HRS data and over 60 percent of those in the
SCF data have intermediate wealth–earnings ratios that exceed the
wealth–earnings benchmark. These findings lend support to the view that,
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55. Fuchs (1998a) cites data showing that health expenditure per capita for persons over
age sixty-five is more than three times greater than that before age sixty-five, but this
includes government-provided care as well as out-of-pocket expense. Fuchs (1998b) notes
that if health expenditures continue to grow at the same rate as they have in the past, health
care for the elderly will absorb 10 percent of GDP in 2020, compared with 4.3 percent in
1995. He estimates that this will require either a sizable increase in public health expendi-
ture or a reduction in the amount of nonhealth private goods and services the elderly can pur-
chase compared with earlier years, or both. See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) for
information on the age profile of health expenditure, and Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy (1994)
for an analysis of nursing home stays.
56. Lee and Skinner (1999).
57. Bernheim and Scholz (1993).
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even with a time preference rate of 3 percent, our model generates high
wealth benchmarks relative to previous work.
Extensions
Several features of the model should be kept in mind in interpreting
the results and serve as points of comparison with other studies and as a
source of possible future research. 
ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTY. By ignoring uncertainty regarding asset
returns, income during retirement, and health care expenditure, the model
understates the demand for precautionary saving and overstates the ade-
quacy of actual saving. However, Jonathan Skinner shows that uncertainty
in the rate of return has a negligible impact on saving, especially relative
to the importance of uncertain earnings.58 This is so because, for most
households for most of their lives, the vast majority of lifetime wealth is in
the form of human capital. Our simulation of a stock market decline above
is also intended to capture some of the possible effects of changes in asset
prices.
The impact of income uncertainty in retirement may also be small. In
the model, retirement income consists of social security, pensions, and
the return on existing assets. Social security is fixed in real terms in the
model and in the real world (subject to the legislative risk noted above),
and Skinner’s finding suggests that plausible variation in the overall return
to existing assets does not generate much extra precautionary saving. 
Adding uncertainty regarding health care expenditure could have a sig-
nificant effect. Daniel Feenberg and Skinner find substantial time persis-
tence in large medical expenditures.59 Glenn Hubbard, Skinner, and
Stephen Zeldes show that uncertainty about health expenses increases pre-
cautionary saving.60 However, during the working years, earnings uncer-
tainty has a much larger impact. We chose not to model health care
uncertainty explicitly. However, we believe that raising the wealth–
earnings ratios by 20 percent, as in table 12, would account for a large por-
tion, if not all, of realistic uncertainty about health care expense.
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PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INSURANCE. The effects of introducing uncer-
tainty can be overstated, however, unless such changes are coupled with
the introduction of plausible insurance schemes to protect against that
uncertainty. The simulation model has no government-provided consump-
tion floor. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes show that such a floor reduces
precautionary saving dramatically, especially among lower-income house-
holds.61 Because social security is progressive, low-income households
have optimal wealth–earnings ratios that are lower than those of other
households even in the absence of a consumption floor. Thus, incorporat-
ing a consumption floor would reduce the optimal wealth–earnings ratio
for those who already have low optimal ratios. This could explain a sig-
nificant portion of the results in tables 6 and 10 that show that actual
wealth-earnings ratios sometimes fall below simulated wealth–earnings
ratios at the bottom of the distribution.
Likewise, the introduction of private annuity markets could insure
against the risk of outliving one’s assets and reduce precautionary saving
in the model. Although private annuity markets used to be quite small, they
have grown dramatically in recent years.62 A significant minority of house-
holds in their fifties now hold annuities.63 Thus, omitting an annuity
market, like the absence of social insurance, raises the simulated wealth–
earnings ratios relative to those in a model that contains private annuity
markets. This biases our analysis toward concluding that actual saving is
inadequate.
OTHER ARGUMENTS OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION. In the model, utility
depends only on consumption. Extending the model to incorporate leisure
as a substitute for consumption would allow for an optimal drop in con-
sumption upon retirement, as households increase their leisure by around
1,000 to 2,000 hours per year and effectively substitute time for money.
Alternatively, leisure and certain forms of consumption expenditure, such
as travel, may be complements, which would increase some spending on
those items after retirement. 
Another important extension would consider health in the utility func-
tion. A household’s standard of living, and the marginal utility of a given
basket of consumption goods, undoubtedly depend on the household’s
118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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62. Gentry and Milano (1998); Poterba (1997).
63. Brown (1999).
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health status, which could be expected to shift markedly between pre-
and postretirement periods. The model, however, ignores health status,
implicitly assuming it is held constant. The bias created by omitting health
from the utility function is ambiguous. Deteriorating health may increase
out-of-pocket health expenditures, but it may also simultaneously reduce
other expenditures, which households would have preferred to have made
when healthy.
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS. Adding a bequest motive would
raise the level of required saving, but this may not be very important for
studying the adequacy of saving, because the desire to leave a bequest is
likely to be less important than the adequacy of one’s own saving and is
likely to be an issue mainly for wealthy households.64 Moreover, clear
evidence of intentional bequest motives has proven difficult to generate.65
Allowing for transfers from children to parents would, on the other hand,
reduce the required level of saving in the model, but such transfers are rare
in practice.66
RETIREMENT FLEXIBILITY AND PARTIAL RETIREMENT. By setting retire-
ment at a predetermined age, the model overstates required saving. In
practice, workers who reach a given age and find that they have insufficient
wealth for retirement usually have the option of continuing to work. Thus
the ability to vary the date of retirement is to some extent a substitute for
saving. In addition, the model overstates required saving by omitting par-
tial retirement, which is growing in importance (and is discussed further
below), and by omitting the decline in work-related expenses for those
who do fully retire.
HOUSING. The model creates different biases with respect to housing.
The model does not require people to build up a down payment in order
to buy a house. This leads to an understatement of required wealth for very
young households. But these are not the households on the verge of retire-
ment that our analysis and policymakers are most concerned about. On the
other hand, the model does not account for the fact that, when mortgages
are paid off, the household can consume the same amount with lower
expenditure. This leads to an overstatement of required wealth for older
households.
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TAXES. Both the model and the data focus on ratios of before-tax
wealth to before-tax earnings. Ideally, the analysis would be carried out
exclusively in after-tax terms. Although the distinction between taxable
and tax-preferred assets is important in some contexts,67 it is unclear how
our focus on before-tax values biases our results. Our best judgment is that
the net effect is small.
Comparisons with Popular Financial Advice
Popular financial advice often suggests that households should aim to
replace between 65 and 85 percent of preretirement income in retirement.68
This section compares such advice with the model and results above by
developing three sets of results. First, we discuss why 65 to 85 percent of
preretirement income might be considered a sufficient target. Second, we
show that our simulation model generates replacement rates in this range.
Third, using these targets, we show that many households can cobble
together sufficient retirement income without large amounts of saving in
financial assets. This finding is important because it suggests that opti-
mization and adequate saving are not inconsistent with the widespread
empirical finding that many households accumulate little in the way of
financial assets.
Developing Replacement Rate Targets
A household can maintain the same consumption during retirement
with less income than before retirement for several reasons. The need to
save for retirement ceases, or at least diminishes substantially. Taxes
decline because payroll taxes are no longer due, because income is gener-
ally lower, because social security benefits receive more favorable income
tax treatment than wages, and because of the extra exemption for those
over sixty-five. Work-related expenses such as for commuting and clothing
decline. Family size declines as the grown children leave the household.
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67. See Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
68. For example, see American Savings Education Council (undated); U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (1997); Palmer (1994); Tacchino and Saltzman (1999); Tyson (1997). War-
shawsky and Ameriks (1998) and Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Warshawsky (1999) provide
interesting analyses of the economic features of popular financial planning models.
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Family size declines further, of course, if either spouse dies. Households
eventually pay off their mortgages, which allows for continued consump-
tion of housing services at less expense than before. Finally, households
can consume some of their asset principal—not just income—in
retirement. 
Consider a household that contributed 5 percent of wages to a 401(k)
plan while its members were working, paid payroll taxes of 7.65 percent of
earnings, had commuting expenses of 3 percent of income, paid off a mort-
gage whose annual payment was 6 percent of preretirement income, and
saw its average federal and state income tax payments fall by 4 percent of
income after retirement. A postretirement income of 75 percent of pre-
retirement income would be sufficient to maintain that household’s living
standard.69 The household could maintain its consumption per capita on
even less income if family size fell or if the household slowly liquidated its
assets. If it values the increase in leisure at retirement, the household could
maintain its living standard with even less income.
Replacement Rates in the Simulation
The simulation model developed above can be used to calculate
replacement rates, which we define as the sum of social security benefits,
pension benefits, and the return (but not any principal) on other assets, as
a percentage of preretirement income. These rates vary, of course, by edu-
cation and pension status. Using a time preference rate of 3 percent, the
average of the median replacement rate in each of the four education and
pension groups is 72 percent. Using a time preference rate of zero, the
average of the median replacement rates is 80 percent. Households in the
model, however, will optimally consume some of their asset principal in
retirement, as well as draw on the income sources noted above. These find-
ings provide some support for the reasonableness of common financial
advice to replace between 65 and 85 percent of preretirement income.
Saving Enough Versus Saving a Lot
Even without saving a large share of income in terms of financial assets,
households can easily achieve replacement rates that are within the range
recommended by financial planners and by the simulation model. The
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starting point is social security. As discussed in appendix B, social security
replaced about 49 to 62 percent of final earnings for the typical new ben-
eficiary couple in 1982. Adjusting for a 20 percent decline in social secu-
rity benefits since then, as described in appendix B, suggests a replacement
rate of 40 to 50 percent. Alternatively, the Social Security Administration
shows that replacement rates for low, average, and high earners who first
receive benefits at age sixty-five in 1990 or 2000 would be about 58 per-
cent, 43 percent, and 25 percent, respectively.70 Consideration of a spouse
would raise these replacement rates at the household level by up to one-
half. Addition of a typical DB pension plan raises these figures still further
(see appendix B). Thus the combination of social security and pensions
can provide all or most of the income needed to finance an adequate retire-
ment, by financial planning standards, for some people even in the absence
of any additional saving.
If social security and pensions are not sufficient, households have the
option of working part-time in retirement. Growing evidence suggests that
many workers prefer to reduce their hours gradually rather than abruptly.
Joseph Quinn finds that between one-third and one-half of older Ameri-
cans will work on a bridge job before retiring completely.71 Leora Fried-
berg shows that the frequency of part-time work among older men almost
doubled between 1980 and 1995 and rose slightly for older women.72 A
recent survey of well-off retirees and near-retirees suggests that half of
recent retirees and over 60 percent of preretirees expect to work in retire-
ment, but that few expect to do so full-time.73 According to a recent sur-
vey by the American Association of Retired Persons, 80 percent of baby
boomers say they plan to work at least part-time during retirement,
whereas just 16 percent say they will not work at all.74 About 35 percent of
baby boomers say they will be working part-time mainly for the sake of
interest and enjoyment; 23 percent say they will work part-time mainly for
the income it provides. In 1996, earnings from work represented about
34 percent of the income of households with heads aged sixty-five to sixty-
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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71. Quinn (1999).
72. Friedberg (1999).
73. Forum for Investor Advice (1999).
74. American Association of Retired Persons (1999).
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nine, and about 39 percent of such households had positive earnings.75 The
increasing tendency for people to hold bridge jobs implies that, in the
future, retired households may acquire an even more significant portion
of their income from working.
In addition, many households could obtain significant income from the
equity in their homes. In our HRS sample, 30 percent of households have
completely paid off their mortgages, and 44 percent have homes worth at
least twice their annual earnings. Thus, for many households, a reverse
mortgage or sale of a house could provide a nontrivial income source. 
Finally, a significant fraction of households will receive inheritances
that will help provide retirement income. For all of these reasons, many
households can piece together sufficient retirement income without nec-
essarily saving much—or, as in the examples above, without saving any-
thing—in the way of (nonannuitized) financial assets. This may not be a
recommended strategy, but it does help reconcile our results with the
common finding that many households have few if any financial assets,
even on the eve of retirement.76
Comparisons with Previous Findings
At first glance, our results stand in contrast to much—but not all—of
the previous literature, which has largely concluded that many, if not most,
households are saving less than is adequate for retirement. In this section
we present evidence suggesting that previous results and methodologies
are, in fact, largely consistent with the general tenor of our findings.
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Simulation Models of Optimal Wealth Accumulation
This paper and several earlier studies analyze the adequacy of saving by
comparing simulated optimal saving behavior with actual household data.
This approach raises several general concerns. Most important, other sim-
ulation studies produce a single optimal wealth-earnings ratio (or wealth
level) for a group of households with the same current characteristics.
Recognition of earnings uncertainty, however, requires that the optimal
ratio be interpreted as a mean or median, not a minimum. We will assume
that previous studies can be interpreted as reporting median ratios. Since
the mean wealth ratio will typically be higher than the median, if we
assumed that previous nonstochastic studies have generated a mean ratio,
it would be easier to reconcile previous results with our own.
A second concern is that, as noted above, there almost certainly will
be biases in the simulation model, the data, or both, that over- or understate
the severity of the saving problem. A third is that the manner in which
any saving shortfalls are reported can have important effects on the inter-
pretation of the results.
Bernheim models households’ optimal saving and consumption choices
as a function of family size, education, earnings, age, social security, pen-
sions, and other factors.77 He then compares households’ actual saving
with the simulation results. His primary finding, summarized in a “baby
boomer retirement index,” is that boomers’ retirement saving averages
only about one-third of that needed to maintain preretirement living stan-
dards in retirement.78
The main issue in interpreting these results is understanding what the
baby boomer index measures. It does not measure the adequacy of saving
by the ratio of total retirement resources (social security, pensions, and
other assets) to total retirement needs (the wealth necessary on the eve of
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
77. Bernheim (1992, 1995).
78. Bernheim (1997, p. 43) characterizes his work as “consistently find[ing] that baby
boomers are saving at 33 to 38 percent of the rate required to cover their expected costs of
retirement.” However, the consistency of his results is open to question. The first survey
found that saving in all nonhousing assets was 34 percent of the required level (Bernheim,
1992). The second study found that saving in all nonhousing assets had increased substan-
tially—to 56 percent of required saving—but it also noted that saving in retirement assets
was only 16 percent of required saving. By taking an average of the 56 and 16 percent fig-
ures, the second survey produced a boomer retirement index of 36 percent (Bernheim,
1994c).
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retirement to maintain preretirement living standards). Instead, it examines
the ratio of actual saving in financial assets to the total required amount
of saving less social security and pensions.
Table 13 helps explain how the index is constructed. In case A, a hypo-
thetical household (or group of households) needs to accumulate 100 units
of wealth. It is on course to generate 61 units in social security, 30 in pen-
sions, and 3 in other assets.79 Total retirement resources are therefore pro-
jected to be 94 percent of what is needed to maintain living standards.
But according to the baby boomer index, the household is saving only
33 percent (= 3/[100 – 61 – 30]) of what it needs.
Thus one problem is that the level of the baby boomer index understates
the overall adequacy of retirement preparations, and that understatement
can be vast. In particular, having the baby boomer index stand at one-
third does not at all imply that, unless they change their saving behavior,
boomers will have living standards in retirement equal to one-third of their
current living standards. It would only have that meaning if both social
security and pensions were equal to zero (as in case B). It could mean
that retirement living standards will be 94 percent of current living stan-
dards (case A), or 60 percent (case C), or any figure from 33 percent to
more than 99 percent.80
A second problem is that changes in the baby boomer index over time,
or differences across groups, do not correspond to changes or differences
in the adequacy of overall retirement saving. If, as in case D, the household
in case A rolls over its pension into an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA), the baby boomer index rises dramatically, even though total retire-
ment resources are unchanged. If, as in case E, the household in case A
rolls over half of its pension into an IRA and spends the rest on a vaca-
tion, the household clearly is less well prepared for retirement than
before—its index of total retirement resources falls. Yet it obtains a higher
baby boomer index than in case A.
A third problem is that the baby boomer index can be extremely sensi-
tive to estimates of retirement needs. In case F, retirement needs are only
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5 percent lower than in case A, but the boomer index rises from 33 per-
cent to 75 percent. In case G, retirement needs are only 7 percent lower
than in A, yet the boomer index rises from 33 percent to 150 percent. For
all of these reasons, we conclude that the boomer index is not useful as a
guide to understanding the adequacy of retirement saving.
Bernheim and Scholz use Bernheim’s model,81 but rather than report a
baby boomer index, they compare wealth accumulation targets from the
simulation with actual household data. Their sample, taken from the
1983–86 SCF, focuses on married households where the husband works
full time and is between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. Looking
at five-year age groups within the sample, they find that the median
college-educated household in each age group is accumulating about what
the simulation indicates is optimal. For non-college-educated households
up to ages forty-five to forty-nine, the median household is also roughly on
target. However, median older non-college-educated households have less
than optimal wealth. The authors conclude that “many Americans, partic-
ularly those without a college education, save too little.”
We believe that their results are not necessarily evidence of under-
saving. Because earnings are in fact stochastic, the model targets should be
interpreted as medians of the distribution of optimal wealth-earnings
ratios. Thus the Bernheim-Scholz findings for college-educated house-
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Table 13. Performance of Alternative Measures of Retirement Saving Adequacy
Under Selected Scenarios
Total Boomer Total
Social Other retirement index resources
Case security Pension assets resourcesa Needsb (percent)c index (percent)d
A 61 30 3 94 100 33 94
B 0 0 33 33 100 33 33
C 20 20 20 60 100 33 60
D 61 0 33 94 100 85 94
E 61 0 18 78 100 45 78
F 61 30 3 94 95 75 99
G 61 30 3 94 93 150 101
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Social security plus pensions plus other assets.
b. Needs are defined such that 100 equals accumulated wealth on the eve of retirement sufficient to keep a constant living
standard before and after retirement.
c. The baby boomer retirement index (Bernheim, 1992, 1995) is defined as (other assets)/(needs – social security – pensions).
d. The total resources index is defined as (total retirement resources)/(needs).
81. Bernheim and Scholz (1993). 
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holds in all age groups and non-college-educated households up to age
forty-nine should not be interpreted as showing that half of those house-
holds are saving too little. Rather, the results show no evidence of under-
saving for these groups. Only the group of non-college-educated
households over age fifty shows any signs of undersaving. However, as
Bernheim and Scholz note, they use a narrow definition of wealth that
excludes housing equity. Using our simulation model with a time prefer-
ence rate of 3 percent, we find that, using this narrow definition, only
28 percent of non-college-educated households aged fifty to sixty-two in
the 1992 SCF exceed the median simulated wealth targets. However, when
we use the broad wealth definition (which, again, includes all of housing
equity), the figure rises to 48 percent. Using the Bernheim-Scholz targets
with the 1992 SCF, 36 percent of non-college-educated households have
narrow wealth–earnings ratios exceeding the target, and 65 percent have
broad wealth–earnings ratios exceeding the target. Thus inclusion of hous-
ing wealth eliminates most or all of the estimated shortfall between median
actual and median simulated wealth-earnings ratios for these households,
depending on the benchmark used.
Bernheim and Scholz point out that the underlying model understates
the retirement saving problem because it assumes no reduction in social
security benefits, no increase in life span, and no increase in health care
costs at retirement, and it ignores motives for saving other than retire-
ment.82 Other factors, however, bias the model the other way. Besides
housing wealth, the model also omits all earnings after retirement, any
decline in work-related expenses for those who do retire fully, and all
inheritances. Table 12 provides estimates of the relative importance of
these biases using our model, which allows for both precautionary and
retirement saving.83
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83. Gale (1997) estimates the proportion of households that exceed the Bernheim and
Scholz (1993) wealth targets. Using a sample similar to that of Bernheim and Scholz and
ignoring housing equity, he finds that 47 percent of households had wealth above the target
levels in 1992. When housing is included, the figure rises to 71 percent. These estimates pro-
vide very high measures of the adequacy of saving, especially when the wealth targets are
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his results as showing that many households were saving adequately but that a significant
minority were not. This interpretation, however, is flawed because it, too, is based on the
assumption that the target wealth ratios are minima rather than medians.
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Warshawsky and Ameriks apply data from the 1992 SCF to a popular
financial planning program.84 Their sample includes households where
either the respondent or the respondent’s spouse or partner was employed
full time, the respondent or spouse was between twenty-five and seventy
years old, nonfinancial assets were below $1 million, and annual salary was
below $125,000. They find that 52 percent of these “working, middle-class
American households will not have fully funded retirements.” Among
households with wealth shortfalls, the median undiscounted shortfall is
$273,000, and the mean is $297,000. Although these results appear, at first
glance, to represent significant amounts of undersaving, we believe the
findings are consistent with little or no undersaving, for several reasons.
First, the paper assumes that earnings are nonstochastic. Allowing for
stochastic earnings, the Warshawsky and Ameriks results indicate that
almost half (48 percent) of households exceed the median optimal wealth-
earnings ratio. This finding is consistent with the simulation model we
have developed above. 
Second, wealth available to finance retirement consumption may be
understated. Households are forbidden in the model to use 75 percent of
their primary housing equity to finance consumption. They may not sell
any businesses, second homes, or other nonfinancial assets, and these
assets are assumed to generate no cash income. All inheritances and earn-
ings from part-time work in retirement are ignored.85
Third, current consumption is set equal to wage income less taxes, pen-
sion saving contributions, housing expenses, and debt payments. This is
likely to overstate consumption because it assumes there are no active con-
tributions (as opposed to interest accruals) to discretionary saving, includ-
ing fully taxable accounts or Individual Retirement Accounts.86 Because
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84. Warshawsky and Ameriks (1998).
85. The model may also understate lifetime labor earnings before age sixty-five, because
the data on retirement age may be problematic. Some households apparently plan to retire
as young as twenty-seven, and a significant number indicate they will retire before turning
fifty. 
86. In addition, the assumption of zero current active contributions to discretionary sav-
ing, combined with the authors’ assumption that earnings grow faster than living expenses
up until age fifty, implies that active contributions to discretionary saving in previous years
would have to have been negative for those younger than fifty. But this is inconsistent with
observed positive holdings of discretionary assets. One solution to this inconsistency is to
reduce current consumption levels. This would imply lower consumption in all future years
and reduce the wealth targets.
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current consumption determines the entire consumption stream, any over-
statement could have significant effects on lifetime consumption.87
Fourth, the authors add ten years to each person’s life span, which raises
lifetime consumption needs significantly. As shown in table 12, raising life
span can have a significantly deleterious impact on the measured adequacy
of saving. Warshawsky and Ameriks explain this adjustment as a way to
account for uninsured health care and long-term care, uncertain life span,
imperfect annuity markets, and expected increases in life expectancy over
time.88 It is difficult to determine the appropriateness of this adjustment.89
Even if one ignores these issues, it would be interesting to determine the
size of any implied shortfall in retirement consumption. As a rough cal-
culation, with an average retirement period of forty-one years, as in the
Warshawsky and Ameriks paper, a real return of 5 percent, and an aver-
age undiscounted shortfall in retirement wealth among those with inade-
quate wealth of $297,000, the equivalent shortfall in annual retirement
consumption comes to only $2,213 per year. It would be interesting to
know what percentage of retirement consumption that figure represents
and to perform such calculations on a household-by-household basis.
Estimates of the Value of Annuitized Wealth
A second approach is to compare households’ preretirement consump-
tion or income with the consumption or income that could be generated by
converting the households’ wealth into a hypothetical annuity. Alan Gust-
man and Thomas Steinmeier, using data from the 1992 HRS, find that
wealth accumulated through 1992—not through retirement—would
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 129
87. Consumption is held constant at its current level during the working years, falls 20
percent at retirement, and then falls another 20 percent when the first spouse dies. By not
allowing consumption to rise through the working years (as our model does, as shown in
figures 3 and 4), the authors understate consumption and therefore understate required
wealth accumulation. However, by not reducing consumption needs when the children leave
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89. Life expectancy is expected to rise by only three years between now and 2080 (Lee
and Skinner, 1999). Although health expenditure rises in retirement, consumption of other
goods may optimally decline as households age and health deteriorates. 
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finance a nominal annuity replacing 86 percent of projected final earnings,
on average.90 The nominal replacement rate for households in the median
10 percent of the lifetime earnings distribution is 97 percent. The corre-
sponding real replacement rates are 60 percent overall and 66 percent for
the median 10 percent. The average replacement rates for nominal and real
annuities for all groups of lifetime earners except the top 5 percent are at
least 83 percent and 59 percent, respectively, of final earnings, using cur-
rent assets alone. Gustman and Steinmeier conclude that “it is hard to
find evidence of a massive crisis in retirement undersaving of the type
that has been promoted in the media.”91
James Moore and Olivia Mitchell use the same data set to estimate
how much respondents need to save between 1992 and their time of retire-
ment if they wish to preserve preretirement consumption levels after retire-
ment.92 They find that the median household will need to save 16 percent
of annual earnings, in addition to saving that occurs through mortgage
repayment, accruing interest on net financial assets, and accruals in pen-
sion value, between 1992 and retirement at age sixty-two in order to equate
pre- and postretirement consumption. Note that this does not imply that
households have to save 16 percent of their income more than they cur-
rently do. If retirement occurs at age sixty-five, the median household
needs to save 7 percent of annual earnings for the remainder of its adult
members’ careers. Moore and Mitchell also find substantial diversity in
required saving rates. More than 30 percent of households require no addi-
tional saving for retirement at age sixty-two, but at least 40 percent of
households have a prescribed saving rate of 20 percent or higher. They
interpret their findings as showing that “despite seemingly large accumu-
lations of total retirement wealth, the majority of older households will not
be able to maintain current levels of consumption into retirement” with-
out saving positive discretionary amounts between 1992 and their age of
retirement. This conclusion is consistent with the results, but it is also con-
sistent with little or no undersaving in the population, for five reasons. 
First, most of the households in the HRS are typically still working.
Thus it is not surprising that they have not amassed sufficient retirement
130 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
90. Gustman and Steinmeier (1998). They assume that couples purchase a two-thirds
joint and survivor annuity. 
91. Gustman and Steinmeier (1998, p. 23).
92. Moore and Mitchell (1997).
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wealth before they have actually retired. In the typical optimizing model,
households reach sufficiency of retirement wealth only in the last period
before retirement. 
Second, the model assumes that earnings are nonstochastic. Suppose a
household is saving adequately for retirement but in 1992 experiences a
large positive wage shock. Moore and Mitchell, using the household’s cur-
rent earnings, would conclude that the household would have to save very
large amounts to maintain current living standards in retirement. Thus a
significant portion of the households that are thought to need to save large
amounts to maintain preretirement living standards may be households
with positive earnings shocks in that year. Indeed, in subsequent work,
Mitchell, Moore, and John Phillips find that households with high current
earnings are much more likely to have saving shortfalls, precisely the pat-
tern that would be expected if earnings are stochastic.93
Third, having households maintain current levels of consumption into
retirement may be too strict a test for the adequacy of saving. Allowing
for mortality risk, setting the time preference rate equal to 3 percent, and
using a 3 percent real rate of return—but ignoring any reductions in work-
related expenses, mortgage costs, or family size—the present value of
optimal consumption generated by our simulation model between retire-
ment at age sixty-two and the end of life is 28 percent lower than it would
be if consumption were flat over time.94 It is 16 percent lower if the rate
of time preference is zero.
Fourth, even if the median household saved nothing, rather than 16 per-
cent of its income, between 1992 and retirement, its retirement consump-
tion would not fall very much. The median household has current wealth
of $325,000, which is projected to rise to $382,000 at age sixty-two, even
if the household does no additional discretionary saving. The household
needs to save 16 percent of its current income to maintain consumption
in retirement. If the adult household members are fifty-six years old (the
HRS covers households aged fifty-one to sixty-one) and earn $35,000 a
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93. Mitchell, Moore, and Phillips (1998). More generally, households with high cur-
rent earnings could be households that had two earners in 1992 but did not have two earn-
ers for most of their careers. Similarly, a large portion of the 31 percent of households that
appear to do no further discretionary saving before retirement could be households with
temporarily low earnings. 
94. These calculations are based on the age-consumption profiles shown in figures 3 and
4. The percentage declines do not differ significantly across education and pension classes. 
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year (the average of 1992 earnings in the fifth and sixth earnings deciles),95
the household needs to save $5,600 per year for six years. Accumulating
these funds at a real rate of 5 percent would generate $40,000 in additional
wealth by age sixty-two. This would raise the household’s wealth at that
age to $422,000. Thus, even if the median household had no discretionary
saving between 1992 and retirement, it would be able to finance retirement
consumption equal to over 90 percent ($382,000 divided by $422,000) of
the level that Moore and Mitchell describe as optimal.96
Lastly, the study ignores other possible sources of retirement income,
including part-time work and inheritances. The results above suggest that
earning a total of just $40,000 (after taxes and work expenses) from part-
time work during the remaining lifetime after retirement at age sixty-two
would be sufficient to generate the optimal retirement consumption level
calculated by Moore and Mitchell.
Laurence Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak, and Lawrence Summers use the
Retirement History Survey (RHS), conducted by the Social Security
Administration, to compare the constant level of consumption that could
be financed by the elderly, based on their resources in old age, and the con-
stant level of lifetime consumption that the same households could have
financed based on lifetime resources available at the start of their life.97
They find that over 90 percent of married couples could afford consump-
tion in old age exceeding 80 percent of their affordable lifetime consump-
tion level. In addition, depending on assumptions about annuitization,
between 72 and 85 percent of them could afford higher consumption in old
age than over the rest of their lifetime. The authors conclude that the
results suggest little undersaving in the RHS cohort.
Analysis of Changes in Consumption at Retirement
If households are saving inadequately, their consumption has to fall in
retirement. However, interpreting tests of how consumption changes upon
retirement raises several difficult issues. First, how much should con-
sumption fall at retirement? As the household head ages and reaches retire-
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
95. See Moore and Mitchell (1997), table 3B.
96. Similar calculations suggest that if the household had no discretionary saving
between 1992 and retirement at age sixty-five, its consumption in retirement would only
be 6 percent less than if it saved optimally.
97. Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982).
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ment, consumption will optimally fall as family size shrinks, work-related
expenses decline, and mortality risk rises.98 Consumption will fall further
if time preference rates are positive and if consumption and leisure are
substitutes.
A second concern is the distinction between consumption services and
consumption expenditure. In optimizing models, households smooth the
former, not the latter. As households age, many pay off their mortgages.
When they do, the household can maintain the same level of consumption
services with less expenditure than before.
A third issue is whether retirement occurs as part of the household’s
optimal plan or as an involuntary and unanticipated event—such as the
onset of disability—that conveys new information to the household about
its lifetime income. In the latter case, any reduction in consumption
beyond a benchmark level may be the result of the new information con-
veyed by the event that prompted retirement, rather than by inadequate
saving in the original plan. 
James Banks, Richard Blundell, and Sarah Tanner carefully examine
cohort data on British households and find that, even after controlling for
labor force participation, age, mortality risk, and other factors, there
remains an unexplained drop in consumption expenditure on nondurables
around the time of retirement.99 They suggest that the findings are consis-
tent with households’ realization of a negative surprise at the time of retire-
ment. For example, households may have just found out how little they had
actually saved for retirement.
We interpret their findings as suggesting that the implied retirement
income shortfall is fairly small. Between the ages of sixty-one and sixty-
six (during which period almost half of recent British cohorts retire),
actual cohort consumption expenditure falls by about 12 percent. The
authors’ model, which includes age, demographics, mortality risk, and
leisure, can explain about 10 percentage points of the decline.100 Thus,
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98. An increase in mortality risk has the same effect on the age-consumption profile as
a rise in the time preference rate, tilting consumption toward the present and away from
the future.
99. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998).
100. Data were kindly provided by Sarah Tanner. For cohort retiree patterns and the
actual and predicted consumption declines, see figures 1 and 6 of Banks, Blundell, and
Tanner (1998).
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even if other factors cannot explain the residual, only a 2 percent decline
in cohort consumption can be attributed to a shortfall in saving. This seems
small in economic terms. 
Bernheim, Skinner, and Steven Weinberg provide an intriguing analysis
of consumption, income, and wealth around retirement using panel data
from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics between 1978 and 1990.101
They find that households with lower wealth-earnings ratios before retire-
ment and households with lower income replacement ratios in retirement
have larger reductions in consumption at retirement. They note that these
patterns hold even after controlling for unanticipated shocks that could
lead to early retirement. They interpret the results as posing “a significant
challenge to the validity of standard life-cycle models” and, like Banks,
Blundell, and Tanner, suggest that many households may receive an
unpleasant surprise upon retirement.
Surprisingly, however, the results in the Bernheim, Skinner, and Wein-
berg paper actually show that most households experience an increase in
consumption after retirement, again after controlling for unanticipated
events that may cause retirement and affect lifetime income simultane-
ously, and for other factors. To examine the manner in which consump-
tion responds to predictable events that affect the probability of retirement,
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg proceed in two steps. First, they esti-
mate probit models that explain retirement status as a function of house-
hold education, family size, sex of family head, and marital status. A
separate model is estimated for each age between fifty-four and seventy.
Second, they estimate the log of household consumption as a function of
the household-specific predicted probability of retirement, that same prob-
ability interacted with dummies representing the various wealth and
income quartiles, and other household characteristics, including those used
in the first-stage probits. They estimate the second-stage equation with and
without age as an independent variable. However, because the retirement
probability is naturally a function of age, it makes sense to control for
age separately in the regression to isolate the impact of predicted retire-
ment on consumption. Controlling for age, they estimate the following
equation:
134 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
101. Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (1997).
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log C = –0.274*P
(2.8 )
+ 0.073*WQ2*P + 0.212*WQ3*P + 0.195*WQ4*P
(0.9) (2.2) (1.9)
+ 0.157*IQ2*P + 0.331*IQ3*P + 0.298*IQ4*P
(1.5) (3.4) (2.9)
+ other factors,102
where C is consumption, P is the household-specific fitted probability of
retirement, and WQ i and IQ i are wealth and income quartiles, respectively.
The coefficient on P represents the effect of changes in the predicted prob-
ability of retirement on log consumption for households that are in both the
first income quartile and the first wealth quartile.
Table 14 uses these results to display the implied change in log con-
sumption in each combination of wealth and income quartiles. For exam-
ple, for households in the second income quartile and the third wealth
quartile, table 14 shows that an increase in the probability of retirement
raises log consumption by 0.10. This is the sum of three coefficients:
–0.274, associated with the probability of retirement P; 0.157, associated
with IQ2*P; and 0.212, associated with WQ3*P.
Table 14 shows that 60 percent of households are in subgroups where
average consumption rises at retirement, once the other factors noted
above have been controlled for.103 More than 25 percent of all households
(those in the top two quartiles of both income and wealth) are in cells
where consumption rises at retirement by about 20 percent or more. 
About another 25 percent of households are in wealth and income cells
where consumption falls by between 4 and 8 percent at retirement. For rea-
sons noted above, these changes do not strike us as worthy of concern.
Even in optimizing models, consumption should be expected to fall by
some amount as households age and retire.104 Approximately 16 percent of
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102. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. This equation is based on Bernheim, Skin-
ner, and Weinberg (1997), table 5, column c, which uses financial assets to generate the
wealth quartiles. Using total wealth, in their table 5, column d, yields very similar results.
103. More precisely, the finding is that consumption rises for these households in
response to predictable events that positively affect the probability of retirement.
104. It is also worth noting that it can take more than one year to “retire” in their model
(Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 1997, p. 27), so the consumption changes estimated in
the table could be occurring over several years.
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households in the sample are in cells where significant declines in con-
sumption are expected to occur. Thus we view Bernheim, Skinner, and
Weinberg’s results as showing support for the view that the vast majority
of households are saving adequately, and that significantly inadequate
retirement saving is concentrated in only a small minority of households.
Daniel Hamermesh finds that current consumption spending among
newly retired couples in the RHS was 14 percent higher than the annu-
itized value of their wealth (including physical, financial, social security,
and pension wealth) and interprets this as evidence of inadequate saving.105
However, consumption expenditure by a retired couple should fall over
time. As noted above, the simulation results shown in figures 3 and 4 imply
that assuming consumption is constant from age sixty-two until death
overstates optimal consumption by 16 percent, even with a time preference
rate of zero, and by 28 percent if the time preference is 3 percent. More-
over, these figures do not adjust for reductions in work expenses, mortgage
136 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
Table 14. Estimated Change in Consumption at Retirement 
by Income and Wealth Quartile
Percent of Estimated change
Income Wealth total sample in log consumption
quartile quartile in cell at retirement
1 1 6.2 –0.27
2 4.5 –0.20
3 6.6 –0.06
4 7.8 –0.08
2 1 5.4 –0.12
2 9.2 –0.04
3 5.2 0.10
4 5.2 0.08
3 1 6.9 0.06
2 5.0 0.13
3 7.8 0.27
4 5.0 0.25
4 1 6.6 0.02
2 6.1 0.10
3 5.4 0.23
4 6.9 0.22
Source: Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (1997, table 2a and table 5, column C) and authors’ calculations.
105. Hamermesh (1984).
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costs, or reductions in family size. Thus there is nothing implausible or
irrational about having consumption at age sixty-two exceed the annu-
itized value of wealth by 14 percent.106
Hausman and Paquette, using RHS data, find that food consumption per
person falls by 10 percent in households headed by men who retire vol-
untarily and by 30 percent in households headed by men who retire invol-
untarily.107 These results are consistent with inadequate retirement saving,
but are also consistent with the view that planned saving was adequate, but
that involuntary, unanticipated retirement contains news about lifetime
income prospects. Robb and Burbidge find that consumption falls by about
15 percent upon retirement for a typical Canadian blue-collar household,
but does not fall for white-collar workers.108
Intergenerational Comparisons
A fourth approach compares wealth accumulation patterns across gen-
erations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) compared households
aged twenty-five to forty-four in 1989 (roughly the baby boomer cohort)
with households the same age (roughly the parents of the boomers) in
1962.109 Baby boomer households were shown to have more real income
and a higher ratio of wealth to income than the previous generation.
Richard Easterlin, Christine Schaeffer, and Diane Macunovich compare
income, wealth, and demographic status across numerous generations.110
They conclude that boomers are doing “considerably better” than the pre-
vious generation and project that boomers’ status in retirement is likely to
be better than that of previous generations, but not by as much as the
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106. Hamermesh also shows that, among households that were retired in 1973 and
stayed retired in 1975, real consumption fell by an average of 5 percent per year for two
years. He concludes that these households cut back on their consumption in response to their
observed saving shortfall, but there are other possibilities. One is that a significant portion
of households paid off their mortgages, or took long-awaited trips, just after retiring.
Another is that the severe recession that occurred at the end of this period caused retirees
to cut back on their expenditure.
107. Hausman and Paquette (1987).
108. Robb and Burbidge (1989). Mariger (1987) finds that adults over age sixty-four
consume 47 percent less than a younger adult, and he concludes that consumption drops at
retirement. However, his result is based on a cross-sectional comparison of different cohorts
and so does not speak to the impact of retirement on consumption.
109. U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993).
110. Easterlin, Schaeffer, and Macunovich (1993).
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boomers’ increase in living standards during their working years relative to
previous generations.
The last two studies establish the simple and important fact that baby
boomers, to date, are accumulating more wealth than previous generations.
Nevertheless, there is considerable controversy over how to interpret such
findings. For example, the CBO study only implies that baby boomers are
going to do well in retirement if the current generation of elderly is thought
to be doing well; if the retirement needs of the two generations are the
same; if baby boomers will be satisfied to do as well in retirement as
today’s retirees; and if the experience from middle age to retirement is
the same for both generations. None of these conditions is guaranteed. 
First, although the current generation of elderly is generally thought to
be doing well in retirement, some 18 percent were living below 125 per-
cent of the poverty line in 1995. Second, retirement needs may be higher
for boomers because they will live longer than the previous generation,
may retire earlier, and will likely face higher health costs. Third, baby
boomers may view doing as well as the previous generation as a less than
satisfactory accomplishment from a personal or a policy perspective. 
The most difficult issue is whether the boomers’ experience from mid-
dle age to retirement will resemble that of previous generations. Bern-
heim argues that earlier generations benefited from growth of real social
security benefits in the 1970s and from the general inflation that occurred
between 1965 and 1985, which dramatically raised housing values and
reduced the real value of mortgage debt.111 Joyce Manchester, however,
notes that the CBO analysis is based on data from 1962—before the prior
generation received windfall gains in housing and social security.112 Thus
the boomers are currently accumulating more than their parents did before
their parents received windfall gains.113
138 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
111. Bernheim (1994b, 1997). However, if housing is omitted from measures of the ade-
quacy of saving, as Bernheim advocates, it is unclear why an increase in housing wealth
should be thought of as having helped the previous generation.
112. Manchester (1994).
113. Both Attanasio (1993) and Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) found a steep
decline in age-specific saving rates in the 1980s for households born between 1925 and
1940. This suggests that these households responded rationally to the windfall gains they
received in housing and social security. If the boomers do not receive such large windfalls,
they are less likely to reduce their future saving as the previous generation did. It is also
worth noting that the cohort identified by these two studies is essentially the HRS cohort,
which was born between 1931 and 1941. But our evidence above, the results from Gust-
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A number of other factors could evolve differently for boomers and
their parents. Although boomers have benefited from the stock market
boom of the last fifteen years, they may face a weak market if all of them
try to cash in their funds at the same ages. Boomers have had fewer chil-
dren than their parents, which implies lower living expenses, but also
smaller reductions in living expenses when their children leave home.
Boomers are having children later, and so they have less time to accumu-
late wealth after their children finish college and before retirement. And
even with fewer children, boomers will likely pay more college tuition
for their children, because more of their children will attend college and
college will cost more in real terms.114
Several factors, however, will clearly help the boomers’ retirement
prospects relative to those of previous generations. More female boomers
are working, and those that work are earning more than women in previous
generations did. This will raise pension coverage and benefits. It also
implies that boomers will have a bigger drop in work-related expenses
when they do fully retire. Pension coverage and benefits will also rise for
other reasons. Gustman and Steinmeier show that, between 1969 and
1992, if one ignores the effects of changes in wages and years of work cov-
ered, changes in pension coverage and plan provisions would have raised
the total wealth of each household in the HRS by $67,000 in 1992.115 This
is so because older plans were less generous and covered fewer people,
and older generations were covered for fewer years.
Moreover, lifetime earnings may peak later for boomers than for the
previous generation, because boomers are more likely to be in white-collar
jobs than in jobs that emphasize physical effort. This means that, at any
given age, relative to the previous generation, boomers have a greater
proportion of their lifetime income (from which to save) ahead of them.
Finally, as noted above, boomers appear to be much more likely to be will-
ing to engage in partial retirement. Earnings for the baby boomers from
part-time work after age sixty-two could effectively supplement traditional
sources of retirement income to an extent unseen in the past.
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man and Steinmeier (1998), and, we would argue, those of Moore and Mitchell (1997)
suggest that this cohort is doing quite well. This supports the view that the decline in sav-
ing in the 1980s was not irrational for this cohort.
114. Bernheim (1994b, 1997).
115. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999).
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Comparisons with Surveys
The sophisticated methods developed in the previous literature are one
way to glean information about households’ preparedness for retirement.
Another is simply to ask people how they think are doing in terms of accu-
mulating retirement wealth. Unfortunately, deciphering the answers is
not as straightforward as it might seem.
A 1997 survey by Public Agenda found that 76 percent of those
responding thought that they should be saving more for retirement.116 Of
those who felt they were at a point in life where they should be saving seri-
ously, only 6 percent felt they were ahead of where they should be,
whereas 55 percent felt they were behind. A 1993 Luntz Webber–Merrill
Lynch survey asked baby boomers the proportion of income they thought
they should save and the proportion they actually saved. The median dif-
ference was 10 percentage points. More than three-quarters of respondents
said they were saving less than they thought they should. Similar examples
abound. 
The first problem is how to interpret these answers. They could mean
that households are vastly undersaving. But we would not jump to that
conclusion so quickly. After all, in conventional economic theory, con-
sumers have unlimited wants and limited resources. In equilibrium, the
consumer sets the ratio of marginal utilities between any two goods equal
to their price ratios. Thus consumers derive positive marginal utility from
consuming more of all goods. So if asked whether they would like to save
more or “should” save more, consumers may well say yes, because the
utility they would receive from more saving is positive, holding other
forms of consumption constant. Likewise, a worker who is making optimal
labor-leisure trade-offs may nonetheless say that he or she would like to
have more leisure, other things equal.117
A second problem is the astonishing range of answers one can obtain
from such surveys. In contrast to the answers given above, over 70 per-
140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
116. These examples are taken from Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998).
117. Perhaps a professional example will be useful. Suppose we surveyed economists to
see how many articles they read and how many they thought they should read. Most would
undoubtedly answer that they should read many more than they do; after all, how many
economists feel that they read every article that they should? But such an answer would
not necessarily indicate any sort of irrationality. It may simply indicate the impossibility of
learning everything one would like to know.
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cent of workers surveyed in the 1999 Retirement Confidence Survey, con-
ducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute, reported being either
very or somewhat confident that they will have enough money to live com-
fortably throughout their retirement years.118 Similarly, two-thirds of work-
ers surveyed in the 1997 Workplace Pulse Survey said they expect to live
as well or better in retirement than they did while working.119 A 1999 sur-
vey by Roper Starch Worldwide Inc. and the American Association of
Retired Persons found that two-thirds of boomers were satisfied with the
amount of money they are putting away today for retirement.120
A third issue is the apparently inconsistent answers within some sur-
veys. The same relatively optimistic surveys noted above suggest that the
high levels of confidence regarding retirement well-being may not be well-
founded. Although a majority of workers in the Retirement Confidence
Survey claimed to have set aside personal savings for retirement, only
about half had determined how much they need to save before they retire
in order to achieve their planned consumption levels. Of the workers sur-
veyed in the 1997 Workplace Pulse Survey, only 40 percent have put a
retirement plan in place. 
Conclusion
This paper has presented new theory and evidence, and reexamined
existing evidence, regarding the adequacy of household saving. Our study
differs from previous work in that it uses a stochastic life-cycle model to
generate optimal wealth accumulation benchmarks. Because of the uncer-
tainty of earnings, the model generates a distribution of optimal wealth-
earnings ratios among households that are observationally equivalent. This
distribution implies that some households that have very low wealth-
earnings ratios are nonetheless saving optimally for retirement.
Applying the model to data from the HRS and the SCF suggests, in the
base specification, that more than half of households exceed the median
wealth-earnings ratios from the simulation. In addition, households at the
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Benefit Research Institute’s World Wide Web site: www.ebri.org/rcs/index.htm.
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120. American Association of Retired Persons (1999).
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75th and 95th percentiles of the wealth-earnings distribution exceed the
models’ wealth benchmarks. There is some mixed evidence of inadequate
saving among households with low wealth-earnings ratios. Our results
appear, at least at first glance, to be significantly more optimistic than the
interpretations provided in previous research. However, a careful inter-
pretation of previous work indicates that earlier results are in fact largely
consistent with ours.
Nevertheless, several caveats and limitations should be kept in mind.
Our results should not be interpreted as indicating that all households are
necessarily acting rationally, or that there is no saving problem at all.
Rather, we show that there is significant uncertainty regarding how the
adequacy of saving is affected by assumptions regarding housing wealth,
the time preference rate, other model parameters, and real-world contin-
gencies relating to health care expenses, life span, and other factors. Nor
do our results have immediate implications for the welfare effects of rais-
ing private or national saving. 
Clearly, there are significant warning signs that portend potential saving
problems in the future. Lusardi notes that one-third of households in their
fifties appear not to have thought much about retirement.121 Approximately
20 percent of households, including 45 percent of black households and
37 percent of fifty-one- to sixty-one-year-olds who have less than a high
school education, do not have a checking or a savings account.122 Our
results do not include single workers or unemployed couples, although
both of these groups have been shown in previous work to be more at risk
than married couples who work full-time.123
Thus perhaps the best way to interpret our results is that they show that
how a saving benchmark is established has important implications for
measuring the adequacy of saving. This insight, coupled with our best
judgments regarding the model and the data, suggest that households are
largely saving adequately, but other interpretations are possible.
We close by addressing how it could be possible that household saving
may be adequate given that aggregate saving rates have fallen so far in
recent years and remained so low. There is, for better or worse, no neces-
142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
121. Lusardi (1999).
122. Carney and Gale (1998); Lusardi (1999).
123. Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994); U.S. Congressional Budget Office
(1993); Mitchell, Moore, and Phillips (1998).
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sary connection between aggregate saving figures and microeconomic
findings about the adequacy of saving. The official personal saving mea-
sures do not measure wealth accumulation in the form of capital gains,
which have been quite substantial in recent years. They provide inconsis-
tent treatment of durable goods, payments from corporations, inflation,
and taxes.124 They are affected by demographic factors, and they provide
no information on the distribution of saving across households. In fact, our
estimates in table 11 show that some measures of retirement prepared-
ness have improved or remained roughly constant between 1983 and 1995,
even though official saving figures plummeted during this period.
A P P E N D I X  A
A Stochastic Life-Cycle Simulation Model of Saving
THIS APPENDIX DESCRIBES the model used to generate the saving bench-
marks described in the paper. 
Household Preferences 
A household’s expected lifetime utility at age t is defined as:
(1) ELU = Et[
D
Σ
k=t 
πkt (1 + δ)t–kU(Ck;θ)] ∀t = 1, . . . , D,
where Et is the expectations operator (conditional on information available
at age t). 
In the stochastic version of the model, the household’s age at death is
uncertain. If D is assumed to be the maximum length of life, then π tk is
the probability of living to age k (given being alive at age t), where:
πtt  = 1, πtD+1 = 0, and 0< πkt  <1, ∀k = t, . . . , D.
In the certainty version of the model, πtk = 1.
Expected lifetime utility as shown in equation (1) is intertemporally
separable, with a time preference rate of δ. The intraperiod utility function,
U(⋅), is a function of household consumption, Ck (where Ck > 0 ∀k), and
assumed to have the form:
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(2) U(Ct;θ) = φt(Ct/φt)1–γ/(1 – γ) if γ ≠ 1,
= φtln(Ct/φt) if γ = 1,
where the vector of preference parameters θ is composed of the elements
[γ, φt]. The utility function implies a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution equal to 1/γ, constant relative risk aversion equal to γ, and con-
stant relative prudence equal to γ + 1, where γ > 0. Constant relative risk
aversion and prudence imply that the third derivative of utility is positive,
so that uncertain income generates precautionary saving. Consumers with
a greater degree of prudence will devote a greater fraction of their
resources to precautionary saving.
The parameter φt is a time-varying family structure parameter that cap-
tures changes in family size, where φt ≥ 1. Thus the household is effectively
maximizing utility with respect to consumption per capita. 
Labor is supplied exogenously, and leisure is assumed to be separable
in the utility function. Tax revenue collected by the government is spent on
social security benefits, which are transferred to households in retirement,
and government-provided goods and services that are assumed to be sep-
arable from private consumption in the household’s utility function.
Household Budget Constraint 
Household wealth, Wt, at the beginning of period t (after receiving labor
and capital income and paying taxes for period t, but before consuming in
period t) is defined according to the wealth transition equation:
(3) Wt = [Wt–1 – Ct–1](1 + r ta) + Yt + Bt – Tt + It, ∀t = 1, . . . , D.
where labor earnings are denoted by Yt. Assuming that R is the exogenous
retirement age, Yt ≥ 0 for t = 1, . . . , R, and Yt = 0 for t = R + 1, . . . , D.
The average after-tax rate of return on assets held from period t – 1 to t is
r t
a
. Benefits from private pensions and social security are given by Bt,
where Bt = 0 for t = 1, . . . , R, and Bt ≥ 0 for t = R + 1, . . . , D. Inheritances
are equal to It, where i is the (exogenous) age at which any inheritance is
received, so that It = 0 ∀t ≠ i, and Ii ≥ 0. 
Total taxes paid (excluding capital income taxes, which are already
removed from the budget constraint by using the after-tax rate of return),
Tt, are a function of labor income, social security, pension benefits, and
inheritances: Tt = τ{Yt , Bt , It}. Taxes are imposed as a progressive income
tax with a standard deduction and rising marginal rates on all income. To
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capture simply the effect of preferential capital gains tax rates and tax-
preferred saving vehicles, the tax rate on accruing capital income is capped
at 20 percent. A flat payroll tax, similar to social security, is imposed on
labor earnings up to an annual threshold. Inheritances are subject to a flat
20 percent tax, which greatly simplifies the actual system of estate taxes.
Households are not allowed to die in debt. If life span is certain, con-
sumers can borrow in periods 1 through D – 1, as long as net wealth at
the end of period D is positive, where D is the actual and known time of
death. This implies the boundary constraints that WD – CD ≥ 0 and CD ≥ 0. 
In contrast, if life span is uncertain, the household could die in any
period and thus is never allowed to be in a negative net wealth position,
so that consumption is restricted by a set of boundary conditions:
(4) Wt – Ct ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , D,
However, with the utility function in equation (2), households will not
want to borrow against the uncertain portion of labor income even if there
is no life span uncertainty.125 If the probability of receiving zero earnings
in each period is positive, and there is no government-provided or informal
income support, consumers will behave as if they were constrained in their
borrowing even though they are not. They will never borrow and risk hav-
ing nothing to consume in the future.
The wealth transition equation (3) and the net asset constraint in equa-
tion (4) imply the following set of budget constraints:
Yj + Bj + Ij – Tj Cj(5) tΣ
j =1
————————— ≥
t
Σ
j =1
——————— , ∀t = 1, . . . D.j
Π
k =1
(1 + r ak)
j
Π
k =1
(1 + r ak)
where r a is the average after-tax rate of return on assets used to discount
future income and consumption. If life span is certain (and thus there are
no accidental bequests and inheritances), equation (5) collapses to a single
lifetime budget constraint:
Yt + Bt – Tt Ct(5') DΣ
t =1
——————— ≥
D
Σ
t =1
——————— .
t
Π
k =1
(1 + r ak)
t
Π
k =1
(1 + r ak)
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approaches zero. This also implies that the nonnegativity constraints in equation (4) are non-
binding.
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Uncertain Income
For most households, labor earnings comprise by far the largest por-
tion of lifetime income, and diversifying into financial assets with returns
that are negatively correlated with their labor income is difficult. In the
model, larger and more persistent innovations in labor income will gener-
ate a larger impact on precautionary saving.
The log of labor earnings, yt = ln(Yt), is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed, with a stochastic process given by:
(6) yt = –yt + ut,
where realized log labor earnings, yt, is the sum of the mean of log earn-
ings, –yt, and a random term, ut. 
To capture the observed persistence of log earnings shocks over time,
the random component of log labor earnings is specified as a first-order
autoregressive, or AR(1), process:
(7) ut = ρut–1 + εt,
where εt is Gaussian white noise:
(8) εt ~ N(0,σ 2ε).
The AR(1) process for the earnings shock implies that future log earn-
ings realizations depend on past realizations:
yt+1 = 
–yt+1 + ρ(yt – –yt) + εt+1,
and that the conditional expectation of future log earnings is a function of
current log earnings:
E(yt+1|yt) = –yt+1 + ρ(yt – –yt).
As a result, current labor income, Yt, helps forecast future labor income
{Yt+1, . . . , YD} and is a state variable, along with wealth, Wt, and age, t, in
the household’s optimization problem.
Optimal Consumption and Saving 
The value function, V(Wt, Yt, t), for the household’s dynamic program-
ming problem at any age (or time) t is defined as the maximized value of
expected lifetime utility:
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(9) V(Wt, Yt, t) ≡ max{Ct+j}D– tj=0
Et
D–t
Σ
j=0
πt
t+j (1 + δ)–jU(Ct+j;θ),
subject to the wealth transition equation (3) and the net asset constraint
equation (4), which are summarized by the budget constraint equation
(5). The value function can be rewritten as the following recursive equa-
tion (the Bellman equation):
πt
t+1
(10) V(Wt, Yt, t) = max{Ct}
[U(Ct;θ) + ————EtV(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1)].1 + δ
Using the net asset constraint in period t, equation (4), and substituting
the wealth transition equation for Wt+1, equation (3), into the value func-
tion, the Lagrangian associated with the maximization problem on the
right-hand side of equation (10) can be written as:
πt
t+1
(11) L = U(Ct;θ) + ———— EtV[(Wt – Ct)(1 + rat+1) + Yt+1 + Bt+11 + δ
+ It+1 – Tt+1, Yt+1, t + 1] + λt(Wt – Ct)
where λt is the shadow price of the net asset constraint (4) in period t.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this maximization problem are:
L πtt+1 (1 + r mt )(12a) ——— = Uc(Ct; θ) – ——————— EtVW (Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1) – λt = 0Ct 1 + δ
(12b) Wt – Ct ≥ 0, λt ≥ 0
(12c) λt(Wt – Ct) = 0,
where the subscripts on the functions U(⋅) and V(⋅) denote the partial deriv-
ative of the function with respect to the subscripted variable, and rm is the
marginal after-tax rate of return. Equation (12a) can be rewritten as:
πt
t+1(1 + r mt )(13) Uc(Ct;θ) = ——————— EtVW(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1) + λt.1 + δ
Define Ct*as the optimal choice of consumption at time t, and note that it
is a function of the state variables Wt, Yt, and t: Ct*(Wt, Yt, t). Substituting
Ct*(Wt, Yt, t) into the Bellman equation (10) and using the wealth transition
equation (3) to define Wt+1, gives:
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πt
t+1
V(Wt, Yt, t) = U(Ct*;θ) + ———— EtV[(Wt – Ct*)(1 + rat ) + Yt+1 + Bt1 + δ
+ It – Tt, Yt+1, t + 1].
Differentiating this expression for the Bellman equation with respect to
Wt yields:
Ct*Vw(Wt, Yt, t) = Uc(Ct*; θ)——— +Wt
πt
t+1 Ct*
———— EtVw[(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1)(1 + rat )(1 – ——)].1 + δ Wt
Rewriting the right-hand side of this expression gives:
πt
t+1 (1 + rmt )Vw(Wt, Yt, t) = ———————EtVw(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1) +1 + δ
πt
t+1 (1 + rmt ) Ct*[Uc(C*t;θ) – ———————EtVw(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1)]——.1 + δ Wt
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition, equation (12a), the coefficient in brack-
ets on Ct*/Wt is equal to λt, so after substitution:
πt
t+1 (1 + rmt ) Ct*Vw(Wt, Yt, t) = ——————— EtVw(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1) + λt—— .1 + δ Wt
If the net asset constraint in equation (4) is binding, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions in equations (12b) and (12c) show that:
λt > 0 and C *t = Wt.
Therefore:
C *t C *t
—— = 1 and λt —— = λt.Wt Wt
If the constraint is not binding, then:
Ct*λt = 0 and λt ——= 0 = λt.Wt
Substituting λt for λt(C*t/Wt ) into the above expression for Vw(Wt, Yt, t)
yields:
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πt
t+1 (1 + rmt )(14) Vw(Wt, Yt, t) = ———————EtVw(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1) + λt.1 + δ
Using the expression in equation (14), substituting into the Kuhn-Tucker
condition in equation (13), and pushing the time subscript up one period:
(15) Uc(Ct+1;θ) = Vw(Wt+1, Yt+1, t + 1).
Substituting this expression in equation (15) into equation (14) yields the
following Euler equation:
πt
t+1 (1 + rmt )(16) Uc(Ct;θ) = ——————— EtUc(Ct+1;θ) + λt,1 + δ
which holds for all time periods t = 1, . . . , D. This Euler equation (16)
shows that when a household is unconstrained by the asset restriction
(λt = 0), the household is indifferent between consuming one unit in time t,
thus increasing utility by Uc(Ct;θ), and saving one unit in time t and having
(1 + r tm) units to consume in time t + 1, which would increase expected util-
ity by πtt+1(1 + δ)–1Et[Uc(Ct+1;θ)].126 Marginal utility in period t + 1 is an
expected value, since Yt+1 is stochastic. When borrowing is constrained
(λt > 0), the consumer would like to shift resources from the future (bor-
row) where the expected marginal utility of one unit of consumption is val-
ued less than one unit of current consumption. The net asset constraint
prohibits this resource transfer, and λt represents the marginal utility that
would be gained if the borrowing constraint could be relaxed. In the ter-
minal period D, because the functional form of the utility function implies
nonsatiation, there is no explicit bequest motive, and πD+1 = 0, so that the
value function goes to zero in D + 1, and the individual consumes all
remaining wealth, CD = WD. Therefore:
Uc(CD;θ) = Uc(WD;θ) = λD.
The net asset constraint is always binding in the terminal time period,
since the marginal utility of any wealth in D + 1 is zero.
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Model Solutions 
If income is nonstochastic, a closed-form solution for optimal con-
sumption at time t can be derived using the Euler equation (16) and the
budget constraint equation (5'), and is equal to:
Wt + 
D
Σj=t [(Yj + Bj + Ij – Tj)
j
Π
k=t
(1 + r ak)t–j](17) Ct = ————————————————————— ,Ht
where:
[ ]
π t
j 1/γ
—————
j
Π
k=t
(1 + r ak)(1 + δ) j–tHt =
D
Σj=t ——————————————.jΠk=t (1 + r ak)
If life span is also nonstochastic, then the solution for optimal consump-
tion has the same functional form, but π tj = 1 and Ij = 0.
With stochastic income and constant relative risk aversion utility, the
consumer’s dynamic programming problem cannot be solved analytically,
but only described by the Euler conditions in equation (16). A numerical
algorithm that takes advantage of the recursive nature of the dynamic pro-
gramming problem and the finite lifetime of the consumer is used to solve
for optimal consumption and saving. The general idea is to discretize the
state space and then, using the terminal boundary condition for net assets
and the Euler equation, recursively solve the consumption/saving prob-
lem backward from the terminal time period. The first step in the solution
algorithm is to discretize the state space that includes wealth, current earn-
ings, and age. It is necessary to limit the state space to a finite grid in
order to make numerical computation feasible, but it is also important to
make sure that the state space is broad enough to encompass virtually all
possible realizations of wealth and earnings. 
Given the mean earnings path for an individual, along with the sto-
chastic process for earnings described in equations (7) and (8), an upper
bound on the variance for (log) labor earnings is expressed as:
var(y) = σ 2ε [1/(1 – ρ2)],
and therefore the maximum and minimum values for the net earnings
state space in each time period are approximated by:
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Ytmax = exp{(–yt) + χσε[1/(1 – ρ2)]1/2}(18) Ytmin = exp{(–yt) – χσε[1/(1 – ρ2)]1/2}
where χ is defined as the number of standard deviations used to extend
the state space above and below the mean; in practice, χ is usually set to
2.5.127
The limits for the wealth state space are determined by using the sto-
chastic process for labor earnings, and assuming a minimum level of con-
sumption in each period, so that the mean and the variance for wealth in
each period are approximated using the wealth transition equation. The
mean level of wealth, –Wt, in any period t is:
–Wt = ( –Wt–1 – Ct–1min)(1 + r at–1) + –Yt + –Bt + –It – –Tt .
Minimum consumption in period t, Ctmin, is defined as the solution for opti-
mal consumption if the individual knows that labor earnings will be zero
from t + 1 to D, so that existing mean wealth must be spread out over the
rest of the individual’s lifetime:
Ctmin = 
–Wt/Ht,
where Ht is defined as above. The variance of wealth in period t is a func-
tion of the variance of net labor earnings in period t and all previous peri-
ods, t – 1 to 1. Substituting the expression for Ctmin into the wealth
transition equation, the variance of wealth in period t can be derived, not-
ing that var(B) = var(I) = 0, and is expressed as:
var(Wt) =
t
Σj=1{[1 – (1/Ht)]2(t–j) [
t–1
Π
k=j
(1 + rak)2]var(Yj – Tj)}.
The minimum and maximum values for wealth in period t are then:
Wtmax = 
–Wt + χ[var(Wt)]1/2(19) Wtmin = max(0,{ –Wt – χ[var(Wt)]1/2}),
where the lower bound of wealth must be nonnegative because of the net
asset constraint, and once again χ represents the number of standard devi-
ations above or below the mean; in practice, this parameter usually is set at
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realizations when χ = 2.5. Expanding the size of the earnings space increases computational
time but does not noticeably change the numerical calculation.
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3.0.128 To allow numerical computation, the wealth and earnings state
spaces are discretized between the maximum and minimum values. The
wealth state space is discretized on a log scale so that the steps are smaller
for lower levels of wealth, since the consumption function will exhibit
more curvature at low wealth levels.129 The time, or age, state space is
already discrete by definition.
Optimal consumption is calculated as follows. Using the terminal con-
straint, consumption in the final period will be equal to realized wealth; CD
= WD. Since labor is not supplied by the individual during the retirement
phase of the life cycle, and pension benefits and inheritances are nonsto-
chastic during retirement, optimal consumption can be calculated analyti-
cally for any wealth level, Wt, at any age t = R, . . . , D, by:
Ct = Wt /Ht.
If retirement income is stochastic, the numerical procedure described
below can be used to calculate optimal consumption during retirement.
During the working phase of the life cycle, t = 1, . . . , R – 1, optimal
consumption is numerically calculated for discrete values over the
two-dimensional grid of wealth and labor income in each time period t by
iterating on the Euler equation and working backward through the con-
sumer’s lifetime. Values of consumption for wealth and income levels
between the discrete steps are linearly interpolated. For instance, the Euler
equation (16) is solved at time R – 1 by searching numerically for a value
of CR–1 that solves the Euler equation conditional on the state variables WR–1
and Y *R–1, and the boundary constraint on assets in equation (4). The
expected marginal utility of optimal next-period consumption, CR, is inte-
grated numerically as a function of expected wealth, WR, and income, YR, in
period R, using the wealth transition equation (3) and the stochastic
process for earnings in equations (6) through (8). If the net asset constraint
is nonbinding, the marginal utility of current consumption equals the dis-
counted value of the expected marginal utility of optimal consumption in
the next period. The optimal choice of consumption is equal to wealth if
the net asset constraint is binding. Optimal values of CR–1 are found for
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the solution for optimal consumption but does increase computation time.
129. Optimal consumption increases more rapidly at low levels of wealth when income
is uncertain; see Zeldes (1989a), for example.
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the different discrete levels of WR–1 and YR–1, and optimal consumption is
approximated for levels of wealth and income between these levels. The
procedure is then repeated for period R – 2, and the algorithm continues
back inductively to the initial period. The result is a numerically approxi-
mated optimal consumption function that is a function of a three-
dimensional grid of state variables: wealth, Wt; current labor income, Yt;
and time (age), t. 
A random number generator is used to simulate (log) labor income
shocks from a normal distribution, so that a realized labor income path is
projected for an individual. For a given realization of earnings, an indi-
vidual’s corresponding lifetime consumption and saving decisions are
calculated. This procedure is repeated for 10,000 households in a given
cohort, who each receive different earnings shocks drawn from the same
distribution, and thus end up with different realized lifetime earnings, con-
sumption, and wealth profiles over the life cycle. 
A P P E N D I X  B
Selected Parameter Specifications
Social Security and Pension Replacement Rates
Determining the appropriate replacement rates to use is quite difficult,
because the rates vary considerably depending on economic circum-
stances, and because the basic unit of observation in the model and in the
data is the household, whereas most available replacement rate informa-
tion is based on individual workers. 
Defined Benefit Pensions
We calculate DB replacement rates by final earnings and education
level using data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey. The HRS
core survey collects data on job histories, pension coverage, and pension
plan specifics. The HRS also collects information directly from the
employers of HRS respondents with pension coverage. The Institute for
Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan developed a soft-
ware program to evaluate this information. The program combines infor-
mation on job histories from the core survey, detailed pension formulas
from the employers, and user-defined macroeconomic assumptions. The
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program also takes into account any integration provisions with social
security. One of the variables created by the ISR program is the annual
pension benefit as a percentage of final wages—the replacement rate.
Our analysis includes 3,324 workers in the HRS who report having
DB pension coverage on their current job. Of these, however, about one-
third do not have an employer-provided pension plan match. We use a hot
deck procedure to impute a plan for these respondents, based on industry
and occupation. Our assumptions regarding interest, inflation, and wage
growth correspond to the intermediate assumptions of the 1995 Social
Security Administration Trustees report.130
To be consistent with our base simulation model, we assume retire-
ment at age sixty-two. The replacement rates calculated here reflect DB
pensions on the current job as well as DB pensions from previous jobs,
for the sample of workers with current DB coverage.
For workers with sixteen or more years of education, we find that the
average replacement rate (projected annual pension benefits divided by
projected final earnings) is 37.6 percent when weighted by population
weights and by final earnings, and 37.1 percent when weighted only by
population weights. For workers with less than sixteen years of educa-
tion, the averages are 30.9 percent and 29.7 percent, respectively. Hence,
we use values of 37 percent for college-educated households and 30 per-
cent for other households.
Social Security Replacement Rates
Unfortunately, we were unable to access the Social Security Earnings
Benefit Files associated with the HRS for purposes of this project. We
hope to explore this data source in future work. Instead, we gathered
information on social security replacement rates from several sources.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) defines low earners as those
earning 45 percent of the average covered wage, medium earners as those
earning 100 percent of the average covered wage, high earners as those
earning 160 percent of the average covered wage, and maximum earners
as those earning the payroll tax maximum. As an example, in 1997 these
wages corresponded to earnings of $12,341, $27,426, $43,881, and
$65,400, respectively. The SSA reports replacement rates for workers
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who are either low, medium, high, or maximum earners throughout their
career. The replacement rates for retirees who first receive benefits at
age sixty-five in 2000 are projected to be about 53 percent, 40 percent,
32 percent, and 24 percent of final earnings, respectively.131
These figures suggest, at first glance, that it would be appropriate to
use very high replacement rates. However, several issues arise in attempt-
ing to convert these results into replacement rates in our model. First, the
wage profiles used by the Social Security Administration are hypothetical
and highly unlikely. Second, they are not delineated by education class.
Third, the figures are for individuals who retire at age sixty-five, rather
than for households that retire at age sixty-two. The earlier retirement age
in the model suggests reducing the replacement rates by one-fifth. Con-
sideration of a spouse suggests raising the replacement rates by some frac-
tion between zero and one-half. It is useful to note, however, that the SSA
replacement rates have fallen by about 15 to 20 percent (not percentage
points) since 1980, when they were 68 percent, 51 percent, and 32 percent,
for low, medium, and high earners, respectively. By 2040 they are pro-
jected to fall to 49 percent, 37 percent, and 24 percent, respectively, for
those retiring at age sixty-five. This represents a 20 percent decline for
the first two groups, and virtually no change for the high earners.
Grad provides evidence of replacement rates earned by newly retired
workers in 1982.132 As she notes, one of the advantages of using actual
replacement rates is that they reflect “the complexities of real life work-
ers.” Grad shows that for retiring men and their wives, the median social
security replacement rate was 49 percent of final earnings.133 For retiring
women and their husbands, the analogous rate was 62 percent. An aver-
age of these rates is 55 percent. Reducing this figure by 20 percent to
account for changes in social security benefits between 1980 and
1990–2000, as determined by the SSA figures above, and by another
20 percent to allow for retirement at age sixty-two in the model, suggests
median replacement rates for current retirees of 35 percent. 
Using this figure as our base, we adopt replacement rates in the model
that are, if anything, lower than warranted. We use a 35 percent replace-
ment rate for the less educated group, even though, on average, they are
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likely to have lifetime incomes below the median and thus replacement
rates higher than the median, because social security is progressive. We
use a 21 percent replacement rate for highly educated households. This is
approximately what high-earner households who retire at age sixty-two
would receive, based on the SSA data above. 
Other sources of data confirm the general validity of our estimates. Wia-
trowski uses information on employee benefits in medium and large pri-
vate establishments in 1989.134 He finds that total pension income (from
the worker’s DB plan on the current job, and from the worker’s and his or
her spouse’s social security payment) at age sixty-two ranges between 36
and 60 percent of final earnings by earnings group for full-time workers
with twenty years of service. It ranges between 48 and 81 percent for those
with thirty years of service.
Second, using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Laib-
son, Reppetto, and Tobacman (1998) estimate replacement rates of 41 to
45 percent for households where the head has less than sixteen years of
education, and 55 percent for college graduates. These estimates can be
compared with ours in table 1 by weighting the replacement rates in that
table by the proportions of households with and without pensions. This
generates replacement rates from our model of just under 50 percent for
households with less than sixteen years of education and 43 percent for
households with sixteen years of education or more. Thus our replacement
rates are slightly higher than those in Laibson, Reppetto, and Tobacman
for households with less than sixteen years of education and slightly lower
for those with more education.
Third, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) use data from the same sur-
vey to estimate labor income and retirement income. Using data from their
appendix tables A-2 and A-3, the implied initial replacement rates are 61
to 80 percent of earnings at age sixty-five for those with less than sixteen
years of education and 81 percent for those with sixteen years or more.
Using earnings at age sixty-two as the base, the replacement rates are 49 to
72 percent and 59 percent, respectively. These figures are, if anything,
higher than the replacement rates we use. 
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Time Preference Rates
As noted in the text, we employ values of 3 percent and zero for the
time preference rate, but we also examined whether negative values would
be appropriate. There is some evidence that people answer survey ques-
tions in a manner consistent with having negative discount rates.135 How-
ever, there are several important caveats to adopting negative time
preference rates.
First, for every survey that elicits answers that appear to imply nega-
tive time preference rates, there are dozens or scores that generate posi-
tive time preference rates. There is a large literature that suggests that the
time preference rates people employ can vary depending on the magnitude,
sign, time delay, and framing issues associated with the discounted
event.136 But the literature almost universally suggests that time preference
rates are positive.
Second, there is little evidence that people actually behave as if they had
negative time preferences. George Loewenstein and Richard Thaler point
to income tax withholding, the preference of teachers to take their nine-
month salary over twelve months, and the existence of upward-sloping
age-consumption profiles.137 But even with a positive time preference,
overwithholding can be explained by such factors as biased withholding
schedules, income uncertainty, itemization of deductions, and fear of
penalties and audits. The preference for taking salary over twelve months
may have to do more with administrative simplicity than with discount
rates. Upward-sloping consumption profiles are standard fare in simulation
models with stochastic earnings and precautionary saving, even with pos-
itive time preference rates (for example, see figures 3 and 6).
Andrew Samwick estimates the distribution of time preference rates
that would reconcile wealth-earnings ratio data in the 1992 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances with the wealth patterns obtained in a stochastic simula-
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tion model.138 In his preferred specification, he finds a wide range of time
preference rates, with a median of 7.63 percent and an interquartile range
of 2.93 percent to 14.66 percent. He finds that fewer than 10 percent of
the sample have estimated negative discount rates. He suggests that these
findings probably represent households that either received inheritances or
plan to leave them—factors not included in Samwick’s simulation model—
rather than households with truly negative discount rates. More generally,
any factor that raises wealth, but that is not included in the simulation,
could contribute to a negative estimated time preference rate. For example,
households that received unusually high returns on previous investments
would, other things equal, have an estimated time preference rate that
was lower than their true rate.
A third problem is the same theoretical concern that affects using a zero
discount rate. In particular, as Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec note,
“Applied uniformly to all choices, negative time preference would require
harsh reductions in present consumption in favor of the future. The fact
that one does not observe such sacrifices, even given the additional induce-
ments of a positive interest rate, is normally taken as evidence for posi-
tive time preferences.”139 Loewenstein and Prelec propose a different
interpretation of the evidence: “negative time preference is applied selec-
tively, to those events that are seen as part of a meaningful sequence, hav-
ing a well-defined starting and ending point.” They argue that “the salience
of particular intervals . . . depends on . . . perceptual framing.” But if it
applied to retirement saving, negative time preference would require the
harsh reductions in current consumption that Loewenstein and Prelec
appear to reject when “applied uniformly to all choices.”
The implied consumption paths seem extreme. With no borrowing con-
straints, no uncertainty, a 3 percent interest rate, and a time preference rate
of –3 percent, the consumer would set the marginal utility of consump-
tion at age twenty-five to be thirty-three times as high as marginal utility at
age eighty-five. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one-third,
the consumption level at age eighty-five would be 3.3 times as high as at
age twenty-five (in the absence of productivity growth or changes in fam-
ily size), and 2.2 times as high as at age forty-five. 
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Loewenstein and Nachum Sicherman claim only that negative time
preference cannot be dismissed out of hand in certain circumstances.140 We
do not disagree, but neither do we believe that negative time preference
in the overall saving decision has been sufficiently established to merit
being used as a benchmark in the simulations.
A P P E N D I X  C
Calculation of Pension Wealth in the 
Health and Retirement Survey
THE HRS COLLECTED detailed pension plan information for about two-
thirds of respondents who reported pension coverage on a current or pre-
vious job. This information was gathered from the respondents’ employers
or from Summary Plan Description data from the U.S. Department of
Labor. The Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michi-
gan developed a software program that uses this information in conjunc-
tion with user-defined macroeconomic assumptions to estimate the present
value of future pension benefit payments. 
We estimate pension wealth from current jobs, and separately we esti-
mate wealth from DB and DC pension plans, including both 401(k) and
non-401(k) plans. To estimate DB pension wealth, we use the restricted
pension plan data, the ISR software program, and the long-term interme-
diate assumptions in the 1995 Social Security Trustees Report.141 We
impute plans to the one-third of HRS respondents with DB plans who
lack a pension plan match using a hot deck match based on industry and
occupation. DB wealth from the current job reflects work to 1992. This
understates DB wealth, since no credit is given for expected future
accruals.
We estimate DC pension wealth on the current job using self-reported
account balances. Previous research suggests that using the restricted
employer-provided pension plan data does not improve upon the self-
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reported account balance data.142 DC wealth reflects self-reported DC
balances if these are given, or imputed DC balances if they are not. When
imputing missing account balances, we take advantage of the longitudi-
nal nature of the HRS by incorporating wave 2 self-reported account bal-
ances when available. For workers with missing wave 1 DC balances who
report balances in wave 2, we estimate their wave 1 balance as the wave 2
balance less any contributions and interest earned between the two waves.
Contributions are based on self-reported employee and employer contri-
bution rates, if available. If unavailable, we use the sample’s median con-
tribution rates of 4.0 percent for employee contributions and 2.0 percent
for employer contributions. We also account for increasing wages by
assuming nominal wage growth rate of 4.9 percent in 1992. We assume a
nominal rate of return of 7.1 percent in 1992 and 6.1 percent in 1993.
We use a regression-based imputation procedure to estimate missing
DC account balance information for those missing such information in
both wave 1 and wave 2. We estimate a log-linear model of account bal-
ances based on wages, employer and employee contribution rates, tenure,
occupation, full-time status, sex, and marital status. 
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Table D1. Median Wealth-Earnings Benchmarks
Education < 16 years Education ≥ 16 years
Age No pension Pension No pension Pension
Bernheim and Scholz
50–54 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.5
55–59 2.4 1.8 2.8 2.2
60–64 3.2 2.4 3.4 2.6
This paper
Time preference rate = 3 percent
50–54 2.70 1.97 2.40 1.39
55–59 3.76 2.66 3.67 2.19
60–62 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
Time preference rate = 0
50–54 4.10 3.32 3.41 2.35
55–59 5.24 4.30 4.82 3.39
60–62 6.47 5.16 6.20 4.37
Source: Bernheim and Scholz (1993); author’s calculations.
Table D2. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Age Among
Households with Less Than Sixteen Years of Education and Without Private Pensions
5th 25th 75th 95th
Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Time preference rate = 3 percent
30–34 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.58 1.35
35–39 0.02 0.18 0.56 1.14 2.30
40–44 0.05 0.48 1.08 1.90 3.46
45–49 0.19 0.99 1.84 2.88 4.89
50–54 0.57 1.70 2.70 3.97 6.26
55–59 1.13 2.55 3.76 5.31 8.04
60–62 1.69 3.28 4.74 6.41 9.31
Time preference rate = 0
30–34 0.02 0.20 0.57 1.08 2.14
35–39 0.05 0.55 1.19 1.98 3.46
40–44 0.28 1.16 2.00 3.02 4.86
45–49 0.80 1.97 3.00 4.27 6.52
50–54 1.47 2.86 4.10 5.55 8.10
55–59 2.28 3.92 5.34 7.12 10.01
60–62 2.99 4.82 6.47 8.35 11.47
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
A P P E N D I X  D
Supplemental Tables
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Table D4. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Age Among
Households with Sixteen or More Years of Education and Without Private Pensions
5th 25th 75th 95th
Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Time preference rate = 3 percent
30–34 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.60
35–39 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.53 1.30
40–44 0.02 0.22 0.62 1.22 2.38
45–49 0.14 0.76 1.39 2.20 3.83
50–54 0.67 1.59 2.40 3.42 5.35
55–59 1.47 2.65 3.67 4.99 7.36
60–62 2.27 3.66 4.91 6.44 9.01
Time preference rate = 0
30–34 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.39 1.03
35–39 0.01 0.16 0.52 1.04 2.09
40–44 0.09 0.65 1.24 2.00 3.40
45–49 0.55 1.44 2.23 3.21 5.06
50–54 1.35 2.42 3.41 4.59 6.76
55–59 2.31 3.63 4.82 6.33 8.91
60–62 3.18 4.73 6.20 7.88 10.66
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
Table D3. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Age Among
Households with Less Than Sixteen Years of Education and with Private Pensions
5th 25th 75th 95th
Age percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Time preference rate = 3 percent
30–34 0.01 0.07 0.23 0.52 1.23
35–39 0.02 0.14 0.46 0.96 2.04
40–44 0.04 0.33 0.83 1.56 3.01
45–49 0.10 0.65 1.36 2.32 4.25
50–54 0.24 1.06 1.97 3.17 5.39
55–59 0.42 1.53 2.66 4.14 6.92
60–62 0.41 1.85 3.28 4.97 7.89
Time preference rate = 0
30–34 0.02 0.15 0.46 0.92 1.91
35–39 0.04 0.38 0.94 1.68 3.11
40–44 0.13 0.82 1.60 2.59 4.41
45–49 0.38 1.43 2.42 3.66 5.89
50–54 0.79 2.12 3.32 4.76 7.34
55–59 1.22 2.90 4.30 6.06 9.01
60–62 1.56 3.48 5.16 7.04 10.24
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
08032—BI/BPEA Engen  12/30/99 11:44 AM  Page 162
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello 163
Table D5. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by 
Current Earnings Among Households with Less Than Sixteen Years of Education 
and Without Private Pensionsa
Earnings 5th 25th 75th 95th
quintile percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Ages 50–54
Lowest 0.15 1.26 2.77 4.56 7.68
2nd 0.55 1.62 2.83 4.22 6.62
3rd 0.69 1.78 2.82 4.12 6.12
4th 0.82 1.80 2.72 3.79 5.55
Highest 0.99 1.81 2.48 3.38 4.88
Ages 60–62
Lowest 1.36 3.81 5.87 8.05 11.26
2nd 1.81 3.62 5.23 7.09 9.65
3rd 1.65 3.41 5.06 6.54 8.68
4th 1.77 3.24 4.43 5.79 7.91
Highest 1.78 2.91 3.79 4.89 6.58
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
a. These simulations employ a time preference rate of 3 percent.
Table D6. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by Current Earnings
Among Households with Less Than Sixteen Years of Education with Private Pensionsa
Earnings 5th 25th 75th 95th
quintile percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Ages 50–54
Lowest 0.04 0.55 1.57 3.20 6.48
2nd 0.74 0.89 1.90 3.29 5.75
3rd 0.36 1.15 2.07 3.33 5.43
4th 0.46 1.25 2.10 3.15 4.95
Highest 0.68 1.40 2.03 2.91 4.45
Ages 60–62
Lowest 0.15 1.25 3.41 5.92 9.61
2nd 0.36 1.74 3.48 5.50 8.43
3rd 0.49 1.96 3.59 5.22 7.57
4th 0.76 2.00 3.24 4.66 6.96
Highest 0.97 2.03 2.90 4.03 5.77
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
a. These simulations employ a time preference rate of 3 percent.
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Table D8. Sample Sizes by Age, Education, and Pension Status
< 16 years of education ≥ 16 years of education
Age Pension No pension Pension No pension All
1992 HRS
51–54 545 281 213 54 1,093
55–59 604 281 197 72 1,154
60–61 196 94 65 24 379
All households 1,345 656 475 150 2,626
1992 SCF
25–29 28 62 7 31 128
30–34 39 80 36 49 204
35–39 50 76 35 74 235
40–44 49 60 45 77 231
45–49 34 62 61 97 254
50–54 38 60 49 72 219
55–59 27 38 39 54 158
60–62 13 20 15 34 82
All households 278 458 287 488 1,511
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS and SCF data.
Table D7. Distribution of Simulated Wealth-Earnings Ratios by 
Current Earnings Among Households with Sixteen or More Years of Education
Without Private Pensionsa
Earnings 5th 25th 75th 95th
quintile percentile percentile Median percentile percentile
Ages 50–54
Lowest 0.22 1.27 2.42 3.83 6.46
2nd 0.67 1.53 2.49 3.64 5.64
3rd 0.79 1.69 2.51 3.54 5.30
4th 0.86 1.68 2.44 3.32 4.75
Highest 0.98 1.66 2.23 2.99 4.26
Ages 60–62
Lowest 2.41 4.53 6.21 8.06 10.92
2nd 2.57 4.10 5.48 7.01 9.28
3rd 2.27 3.85 5.13 6.49 8.45
4th 2.26 3.51 4.58 5.73 7.53
Highest 2.13 3.07 3.88 4.84 6.39
Source: Authors’ estimates as described in the text.
a. These simulations employ a time preference rate of 3 percent.
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Table D9. Sensitivity Analysis: Simulated Median Wealth-Earnings Ratios 
for Households Aged 60–62 Under Alternative Scenarios
Education < 16 years Education ≥ 16 years
Case No pension Pension No pension Pension
Base casea 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
Changes to base-case parametersb
Time preference rate = 0 6.47 5.16 6.20 4.37
IES = 0.5 3.95 2.38 4.29 2.23
IES = 0.25 5.25 3.83 5.32 3.38
Persistence parameter = 0.99 5.20 5.54 5.23 2.68
After-tax return = 5 percent 4.95 3.99 4.75 3.44
After-tax return = 1 percent 3.85 1.99 4.73 1.94
Changes to wealth measuresb
Exclude business wealth 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
40 percent decline in stock market 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
30 percent cut in social security 
benefits 5.52 3.91 5.36 3.28
Add expected inheritances 4.74 3.28 4.91 2.92
Retirement at age 65 4.73 3.14 5.23 2.97
Social security and pensions
as function of household’s
final earnings 4.80 3.28 4.94 2.74
Changes to consumption needsb
20 percent increase in all simulated
wealth-earnings ratios 5.69 3.93 5.89 3.50
10 percent increase in survival 
rates 6.14 4.82 6.01 4.22
Substitution of Bernheim-Scholz
targetsb 2.40 3.20 3.40 2.60
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the simulation model described in the text.
a. The parameters of the base case are as follows: time preference rate = 3 percent, intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) = 0.33, autoregressive persistence parameter = 0.85, retirement at age sixty-two, a real after-tax rate of return of 3 percent,
and social security and pension income derived from the average final earnings of one’s own education class.
b. Specifications of the sensitivity analysis are described in the text.
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Comments and 
Discussion
Christopher D. Carroll: This paper represents a major accomplishment:
it provides the first really credible measure of the extent to which Ameri-
cans are saving adequately for retirement. Although previous work by
Douglas Bernheim and his coauthors has compared observed behavior
with the predictions of a certainty-equivalent model, a large literature has
recently shown that the optimal solution to the consumption-saving prob-
lem changes dramatically when a realistic treatment of uncertainty is
incorporated. This paper is the first to compare observed behavior with the
prescriptions of a model that takes uncertainty seriously and that is other-
wise calibrated to capture a large proportion of the really important fea-
tures of the lifetime saving problem. 
My comments will proceed in three parts. First, I will evaluate how well
the model under the authors’ baseline parameters is able to match actual
data. Second, I will discuss the significance that should (or should not) be
attached to the model’s ability to match the behavior of the median house-
hold under the authors’ baseline set of parameter values. Finally, I will
discuss whether we should believe that households are truly behaving opti-
mally even if the model under the baseline parameters can match the data. 
The fundamental conclusion of the paper is that observed profiles of
median household wealth by age look reasonably similar to median pro-
files that emerge from the dynamic optimization model, if the time pref-
erence rate is set at 3 percent. I have argued essentially this point myself in
an earlier paper on the basis of a much simpler stochastic optimization
model (with a baseline time preference rate of 4 percent).1 Therefore I am
1. Carroll (1997a).
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relieved to see that, broadly speaking, the conclusion holds up in the face
of the many important improvements the authors’ model contains (such
as realistic treatment of taxes, mortality risk, and pensions). The main way
in which the authors assess whether their model fits the data is by com-
paring the profile of median wealth by age predicted by the model with the
median profiles observed in the data. They find a reasonably good match.
For example, in table 5, using their intermediate definition of wealth, they
find that very close to 50 percent of households in the HRS data have
wealth above the median predicted by the model. (If the model were
exactly true, the figures in this column would all be identically 50 percent.)
For the narrow measure of wealth, the proportions tend to be near 40 per-
cent, and for the broad measure they tend to be near 60 percent, but the
intermediate measure seems to me the most plausible measure to use for
the purposes of these comparisons. 
The fit of the model to the data is not perfect, however, and there are
some systematic misses. In particular, tables 9 and 11 suggest that the
model under its baseline parameterization underpredicts saving at younger
ages. For example, in table 9, from ages twenty-five to forty, typically
about 65 to 70 percent of households have more wealth than the model
predicts, and the figures come down to the 50 percent range when con-
sumers are in their fifties.  
A plausible explanation can be found for this underprediction, however:
there is good reason to believe that the model’s specification understates
the amount of income risk that young households face. In particular, the
model’s income process is a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process
with a serial correlation coefficient of 0.85. But a substantial body of
research beginning with Thomas MaCurdy finds that household income
processes have both completely transitory and completely permanent ele-
ments.2 Table 12 presents a sensitivity analysis of the authors’ model that
shows that when the serial correlation coefficient is increased to 0.99,
thus approaching a random walk, the optimal amount of precautionary
saving rises substantially. My own interpretation of this pattern of facts is
that the assumption of an AR(1) income process understates the amount of
precautionary saving that young households need to do, and thus over-
states the adequacy of the assets that households actually have. If the
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income process were tweaked to make it somewhat more realistic, I sus-
pect that even the relatively modest divergences between the model’s pro-
jections and the data could be reconciled. 
Unfortunately, the fact that there exists a set of parameter values (in this
case, the authors’ baseline parameters, perhaps modified slightly to gen-
erate more precautionary saving early in life) that can make the model
match a particular fact like the median age-wealth profile may not be as
impressive as it seems. The reason is what might be called the “dirty little
secret” of the modern dynamic stochastic optimization model: with mul-
tiple realistic kinds of uncertainty, and with plausible assumptions about
the other parameters, the model can predict a very wide range of behavior
depending on the precise configuration of parameter values. The authors
tend to downplay this point by focusing on the model’s implications under
their baseline parameter values, but it is important to realize that those
baseline values are really no more compelling than many other paramet-
ric configurations that would yield quite different predictions for saving
behavior. 
This point echoes other recent discoveries about the flexibility of the
modern version of the dynamic optimization model. For example, Andrew
Samwick has shown that under some parameter values the model implies
exactly the kind of limited offset between pension wealth and other forms
of wealth that has been repeatedly found empirically.3 Some of my own
work has shown that the model can imply high marginal propensities to
consume out of transitory income and low marginal propensities to con-
sume out of human wealth. It can also explain the whole range of appar-
ently contradictory results that have been found in the literature on
estimating Euler equations.4 In all of these cases, the results reconcile the
dynamic optimization model with empirical findings that had previously
been taken as rejections of optimality. 
One can take either of two possible views of the newfound flexibility
of the dynamic optimization model. The optimistic view is that such
results revive dynamic optimization as a plausible description of behavior
for the vast majority of households, after a period when regular empirical
rejections of the certainty-equivalent versions of the model had put the
descriptive accuracy of dynamic optimization in doubt. The less charitable
168 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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view springs from the fundamental scientific principle that, to be useful,
a model must be falsifiable. If the dynamic optimization model can explain
any conceivable observed behavior by varying the assumptions about
essentially unobservable parameters like the time preference rate, it is not
a very meaningful scientific model. 
The latter view is certainly too extreme; certain patterns of behavior that
we could in principle observe (such as saving rates of 90 percent in every
year of life) would undoubtedly lead us to reject any plausible version of
the model. But the critique contains a large element of truth as well, at
least when the model is judged by its ability to match a single fact or a
small set of facts. As the authors themselves showed in an earlier draft of
the paper, the median asset-income ratio at age fifty-two for a set of con-
sumers behaving exactly according to the model ranges from 0.04 to 2.59,
depending on the configuration of parameter values. Given this flexibil-
ity, the fact that some set of parameter values exists that matches the actual
median wealth-income ratio at age fifty-two (and selected other ages) is
not as impressive as it might seem. 
Thus, when examining the ability of the model to explain any particular
fact, it is essential to examine how the model’s predictions with regard to
that fact change under alternative assumptions about parameter values. If
we find that the model matches the fact under a broad range of parametric
assumptions, the assertion that the model is truly capturing actual con-
sumer behavior is more credible than if it can match that fact only under
very specific assumptions.  
The single most important parametric assumption in the paper is for
the value of the time preference rate. Under the authors’ baseline assump-
tion that this rate equals 3 percent, the median household’s saving is
indeed roughly consistent with the predictions of the model. However, this
conclusion is not particularly robust with respect to the assumption about
the time preference rate. Using the zero-discounting benchmark, which I
argue below reflects optimal behavior, the median household aged fifty-
one to sixty-one in the HRS data has a wealth shortfall of about 1.3 years’
worth of income.5
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The other appropriate response to the dirty little secret is to up the ante
by requiring the model to be able to match a wide variety of facts all at
once. Specifically, consider now the question of whether the model, even
under a time preference rate of 3 percent, can match features of the data
other than the median. The authors rightly emphasize that previous work
comparing wealth distributions that result from a stochastic income
process with predictions from a nonstochastic model are highly problem-
atic, and that the only conceptually proper thing to do is to compare the
distribution that arises from a stochastic model with the distribution that
arises in the stochastic real world. However, one pervasive result in this
paper is that the model cannot produce a wealth distribution that is nearly
as wide as that observed in the data. For example, the comparison where
the model has perhaps the closest match to the median data is for the HRS
data under the intermediate measure of wealth (table 6). But despite the
good fit between model median and HRS median wealth, the model pre-
dicts that the poorest 5 percent of households will hold almost six times
as much wealth as they actually do (the model and actual wealth-earnings
ratios are 0.96 and 0.17, respectively). The absolute gap is even greater at
the 95th percentile, where the model predicts a wealth-earnings ratio of
7.78 whereas the actual ratio is 19.5. Of course, as the authors note, exces-
sive wealth does not raise the alarms for public policy that inadequate
wealth does. But the inability of even a thoroughly stochastic model to
match the dispersion in wealth holdings suggests that some other feature
of the model needs to be modified. 
Recent work by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes has shown that the lack
of wealth at the bottom part of the distribution can be explained if the
model is modified to take account of real-world features of the social
safety net that discourage low-income people from saving.6 And in a forth-
coming paper I argue that, to match the extreme wealth accumulation at
the top of the distribution, it is necessary to modify the model to incorpo-
rate a bequest motive in which bequests are a luxury good.7 However, it
must be confessed that such tweaking of the model to force it to fit more
and more facts is very much subject to the criticism outlined above. A
model loses its scientific status if every rejection by the data can be rec-
onciled by postulating some new feature of the model that had heretofore
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been omitted. The only recourse is then to derive and test yet more impli-
cations of the newly modified model; such a tweaking-and-testing enter-
prise promises to be able to keep new generations of economists busy for
quite a while. 
Even if we accept that the authors’ version of the model under baseline
parameter values is a reasonably good match to the data for the median
household, it is not at all clear where that leaves us in judging the opti-
mality of that median household’s behavior. The authors’ position is that if
actual behavior matches the baseline model’s behavior under the baseline
parameters, people are saving optimally for retirement. But I would cer-
tainly not want to take the baseline model’s advice myself, because the
authors’ baseline value for the annual pure time discount factor is an
appallingly high 0.97 (a number which is, appropriately, further reduced
by mortality risk). Although this value is in the range typically assumed
in the literature, consider the implications for a twenty-five-year-old trying
to calculate optimal retirement saving. Since 0.9740 is about 0.3, the impli-
cation is that the rational thing for the consumer to do, if the real long-term
interest rate is zero, is to behave in such a way that when he retires at age
sixty-five he will be so poor that the additional happiness yielded by
spending an extra dollar is more than three times as great as when he was
twenty-five. 
To sharpen the intuitive case that this is not an optimal allocation, sup-
pose that, on this hypothetical consumer’s sixty-fifth birthday, scientists
invent a time-travel device, and we bring together the twenty-five-year-old
and the sixty-five-year-old versions of the same consumer for what we will
politely term a dialogue. Imagine the difficulty the twenty-five-year-old
would have in trying to persuade the sixty-five-year-old that the elder
self’s relative deprivation is really perfectly optimal. 
Thinking of the two selves as being able to communicate helps make
the point that the essence of time discounting is that the utility of the young
“counts more” than the utility of the old. To see this in another light, con-
sider a set of people standing in alphabetical order, and suppose we des-
ignate an outsider to allocate some good among them in a way that
maximizes their total welfare. We would surely view as suboptimal any
rule that allocated the good to people in a way that depended simply on
their place in the line. Yet time discounting implies that when the line of
people is considered to be a temporal succession of selves, the order mat-
ters critically. People near the front of the line receive up to four or five
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times as much of the good (assuming linear marginal utility) as those at the
end of the line. As a matter of logic and morality, there is little more rea-
son to believe that it is optimal for the utility of the young selves to out-
weigh that of the old selves than to believe it is optimal for the utility of the
alphabetically first to outweigh the utility of the alphabetically last.8
This point hearkens back to the early debates surrounding the intro-
duction of the dynamic optimization framework. Frank Ramsey, in his
famous paper which asked how much a nation should save, argued that a
positive rate of time preference was not only irrational but immoral as
well.9 He then proceeded to use a positive rate anyway, because his infi-
nite-horizon model could not be solved with a time preference rate of
zero.10 But Ramsey’s problem does not exist in this context: a life-cycle
saving problem has a perfectly well defined solution with a time prefer-
ence factor of one or even greater than one. My impression is that later
economists argued for a positive time preference rate not so much on the
grounds that it was rational or optimal as on the grounds that people were
irrational and behaved suboptimally in a way that could be conveniently
captured with a positive time preference rate. Economists now employ
the assumption so regularly that it has come to seem rational, but my own
instinct remains that a positive pure time preference rate is irrational for an
individual optimization problem. Economists’ gradual acceptance of a pos-
itive rate of time preference as rational may be a good example of what
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) has called “defining deviancy
down.”
Another problem with interpreting the model’s results as prescriptive of
optimal behavior is that, in principle, when one solves this model, the
assumption is that one has perfect certainty about what the relevant para-
meter values are—even the parameter values that describe the degree of
uncertainty. That is, the assumption is that there is perfect certainty about
the value of the underlying drift term in aggregate productivity growth, and
about the future average age-income profile, and about the mean and vari-
ance and serial correlation properties of the stochastic shocks to income.
Because the precautionary saving motive can be quite powerful in models
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
8. My thoughts on this subject have been stimulated partly by a compelling recent paper
on the social discount rate by Caplin and Leahy (1999). 
9. Ramsey (1928).
10. See also Irving Fisher’s (1930) discussion arguing that a nonzero time preference
rate is irrational, and see Barro (1999) for a recent discussion.
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like this, it seems very likely that, under reasonable assumptions about
the degree of uncertainty surrounding these parameter values, the model
would prescribe substantially more saving than it does. 
Another consideration further undermines our degree of confidence
about the optimality or nonoptimality of the model’s prescribed saving
behavior. That is the fact that good reasons exist for questioning certain
other important features of the model, in particular the assumption that
there is a single, stable utility function over the life cycle. The authors
discuss several reasons why this might not be so, including the possibility
that the marginal utility of consumption is lower after retirement because
work-related expenses such as commuting are diminished. Of course, it is
also logically possible that the marginal utility of consumption rises after
retirement, because retirees have more free time to spend, for example,
on travel. Since we cannot measure marginal utility directly, it is hard to
know precisely how to deal with this problem in the context of the model.
The most valuable kind of evidence would probably come simply from
asking retired consumers in the HRS or some other panel survey whether
their standard of living has risen, fallen, or remained about the same dur-
ing retirement. 
Another way in which the standard model’s structure may differ impor-
tantly from reality is in the assumption that utility is time-separable. There
is a growing body of evidence that the utility an agent derives from con-
sumption depends partly on the level of consumption that the agent has
experienced in the past—that is, utility exhibits habit formation effects.
G. M. Constantinides, A. B. Abel, and John Campbell and J. H. Cochrane
have argued that habit formation can explain various asset pricing anom-
alies.11 Recent work by Jeffrey Fuhrer shows that habits may help explain
the “excess smoothness” documented by Campbell and A. S. Deaton in
U.S. time series consumption data.12 David Weil, Jody Overland, and I
have recently argued that habits may be able to explain why many East
Asian countries had big runups in their saving rates after their periods of
rapid growth had commenced.13 If utility is really subject to important
habit formation effects, there is little reason for confidence that the results
from the authors’ model are even close to optimal. 
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These points about how the utility function may change over a per-
son’s lifetime are very difficult to deal with in the context of the standard
model, because there is no compelling way (at least at present) to cali-
brate exactly how utility functions change over one’s lifetime. This is one
of the reasons why I admire the authors’ enterprise in obtaining and ana-
lyzing data from personal finance guides and other popular sources as an
alternative benchmark for comparison with the data. Presumably, if util-
ity exhibits strong time-varying elements, personal financial planners will
know this, since financial planners get plenty of feedback from retirees
about their marginal utility of consumption (although perhaps expressed in
more colorful terms than those in the economic literature). The fact that the
advice of financial planners matches up at least roughly with the prescrip-
tions of the model does reassure me somewhat on this point.
In conclusion, I think this paper is a major contribution to both the posi-
tive and the normative debates about Americans’ saving behavior. Most of
the difficulties I have outlined are conceptual problems with the entire enter-
prise of attempting to judge the optimality of household saving behavior. If
we were to wait until all these issues had been resolved before attempting an
exercise like this, we would be waiting until doomsday. Despite the con-
ceptual difficulties, it is very useful to see what is the best we can do with the
tools we have available, and this paper meets that high standard. 
David I. Laibson: Eric Engen, William Gale, and Cori Uccello have writ-
ten an outstanding paper that advances the consumption literature. Their
analysis demonstrates that U.S. households may be saving adequately for
retirement after all. Specifically, the authors show that a well-calibrated
model assuming rational behavior and stochastically determined income
can explain the observed distribution of retirement wealth. 
Although the authors’ analysis provides an important new benchmark
for the literature on saving, it is not definitive for two critical reasons. First,
the simulation results depend on numerous institutional and demographic
assumptions that reduce the realism of the simulations. Second, the simu-
lation results depend on time preference assumptions that bias the results
in favor of finding saving to be adequate.
To make their model computationally operational, the authors adopt a
host of simplifying assumptions. In general, I agree with their choices,
but I still wonder how their results would change had they made different
and more realistic assumptions. For example, the authors assume that
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households have no bequest motive, that income is not variable after retire-
ment, and that health expenditure late in life does not rise. These assump-
tions bias down the normative saving rate and bias up the reported
measures of saving adequacy. On the other hand, the authors also make
many assumptions that generate biases in the opposite direction. For exam-
ple, they do not include insurance markets (annuities, for example) or
credit markets, and they set an exogenous retirement date. The authors dis-
cuss many of these omissions in a section on sensitivity analysis, and I
applaud their thorough efforts to evaluate these potential biases. Indeed,
I am convinced that on balance all of these modeling omissions roughly
cancel out. But the large number of necessary omissions naturally raises
questions about the reliability of the benchmark simulations.
The authors’ assumptions about time preferences are more problematic,
since these assumptions generate a clear bias in the results. In their bench-
mark simulation, the authors adopt a normative discount rate of 3 per-
cent, with mortality risk providing an additional discount effect above
and beyond this base level. In their appendix B, the authors note that a 
3 percent discount rate lies within the range of discount rates estimated in
the empirical consumption literature. In theory, one can always find a dis-
count rate that “explains” a given level of wealth accumulation. Using
this approach, any level of retirement wealth accumulation could be ratio-
nalized by picking the “right” discount rate.
The authors need an independent measure of time preference, one that is
normatively grounded. Unfortunately, we have no universally accepted mech-
anism for identifying such a normative measure. However, most evidence
suggests that a normative discount rate should be either zero or negative. For
example, some studies have asked subjects to pick among hypothetical con-
sumption paths. Using this method, Barsky and others find a median discount
rate of zero percent and a mean discount rate of –1 percent.1 These studies
make the budget constraint explicit: higher consumption later in life must
come at the expense of lower consumption earlier in life.
To further explore our intuitions about normative discounting, at the
Brookings Panel conference I asked each of those in attendance to pick 
a consumption path for themselves out of a set of seven possible deter-
ministic consumption paths (for the life-cycle period from age thirty-six
to age sixty-five). The participants were told:
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—You are deciding at age thirty and face no uncertainty (about health
or demographics, for example).
—Consumption represents consumption flows (for example, consump-
tion of housing is calculated on a flow basis).
—The path that you pick will be your actual consumption path (in other
words, you will not have access to asset markets to make intertemporal
reallocations).
—Your household needs will not change over the life cycle (for exam-
ple, you will have no children to send to college).
—You are guaranteed to survive until at least age sixty-five.
The choices of the participants generated a range of implied discount
rates.2 Assuming a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3 (consistent
with the calibration in the paper), the distribution of discount rates was as
follows: –5 percent (15 percent of responses), –3 percent (26 percent),
–1 percent (21 percent), +1 percent (18 percent), +3 percent (15 percent),
+5 percent (6 percent), and +7 percent (0 percent). The mean and the
median discount rate was –1 percent, which echoes the finding of Barsky
and others. By contrast, recall that the authors’ preferred calibration fea-
tures a discount rate of +3 percent.
A preference for a rising consumption profile can also be interpreted
as evidence of habit formation. Specifically, the instantaneous utility func-
tion may take the form u = u(c – X), where X represents the stock of past
consumption. But the specific mechanism that generates a preference for a
rising consumption profile does not really matter. The important point is
that rising consumption profiles are not implied by the benchmark cali-
bration that the authors adopt. Hence their benchmark normative saving
profiles are biased downward, and this biases their measures of saving ade-
quacy upward.
The authors have dramatically advanced the debate on the adequacy of
saving by identifying the right methodological framework for norma-
tively evaluating saving outcomes. My concerns boil down to an issue of
emphasis, since the authors undertake their analysis for both their bench-
mark case—a 3 percent discount rate—and the zero percent case that I
advocate. The authors have provided the right framework for interpreting
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the implications of the normative discount rate. In this very important
sense, the authors have clarified and richly expanded the literature on sav-
ing adequacy. 
General discussion: William Gale responded to a couple of David Laib-
son’s comments. He noted that Laibson’s survey produced mean and
median time preference rate of –1 percent, based on an assumed real
interest rate of 1 percent. However, the slope of the age-consumption pro-
file in the survey depends only on the difference between the interest
rate and the time preference rate. Thus, the survey might be better inter-
preted as showing that the mean and median difference between the inter-
est rate and the time preference rate is 2 percent. If so, then using an
interest rate of 3 percent and time preference rates of zero and 3 percent,
as in the paper, provides differences between the interest and time pref-
erence rates of 3 percent and zero, respectively. That is, the range of
assumptions for the interest rate minus the time preference rate used in
the paper is perfectly consistent with the findings from Laibson’s survey.
He also disagreed with Laibson’s statement that the simulation model
does not generate upward-sloping age-consumption profiles. Even if the
model is made nonstochastic, with a 3 percent interest rate, age-
consumption profiles are upward sloping with a time preference rate of
zero and flat with a time preference rate of 3 percent. The stochastic sim-
ulation model generates upward-sloping age-consumption profiles for a
wide variety of time preference rates.
William Dickens argued that Laibson’s experiment did not address the
question of what people’s true normative discount rate is. People’s answers
to questionnaires like Laibson’s may show that they derive utility not just
from income but also from the beliefs that they hold about the future.
People may choose upward-sloping consumption profiles because they
want to believe the future will be better than the past, but that does not
mean that, looking back over their lives at some future time, they would
not conclude that they would have been better off choosing the path that
maximized total income. Dickens said he found the arguments for a zero
normative discount rate convincing.
William Nordhaus thought it worth stressing that the paper, and the
discussion thus far, had focused on the personal rate of time preference,
whereas Frank Ramsey in his research into this issue had been interested
in the social rate. Nordhaus suggested that the discussion of optimality
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from the point of view of policy needed to address the possibility that
social and private discount rates might well differ.
Giancarlo Corsetti observed that calibration of a model intended to pro-
vide a benchmark for determining the optimality of actual saving is a del-
icate matter. A benchmark is, by definition, potentially counterfactual.
Parameter values need to be picked with some confidence in them being
accurate measures of fundamentals. Instead, it appeared the authors had
picked some parameter values so as to generate simulation results that
match the data in important respects—for example, so as to generate plau-
sible wealth-income ratios. Insofar as the model was calibrated to match
variables that could themselves reflect nonoptimal behavior, interpreta-
tion of the model as a benchmark is problematic. 
Christopher Sims argued that it was important to distinguish between
privately optimal behavior, given institutional arrangements and market
imperfections, and socially optimal outcomes. The model assumes
strongly incomplete asset markets, which may result in outcomes far
from socially optimal. He suggested that perhaps the behavior simulated
in the paper should not be labeled optimal. From the paper’s point of
view, one should be quite comfortable passing bag ladies in the street if
one knows that they knew all along that they might have a stream of bad
luck that put them in this position with a small probability. Individuals
would like to insure against this kind of outcome, but cannot do so
because of the incompleteness of markets. Policy aimed at achieving
socially optimal outcomes should seek to create the appropriate insur-
ance. Thus, when assessing whether savings for retirement are adequate
from a social point of view, it is important to ask whether social plan-
ning for retirement should recognize the need to compensate for asset
market incompleteness. 
Like Sims, James Duesenberry argued that the issue is not whether peo-
ple save adequately from the point of view of individual rationality, but
whether saving outcomes are satisfactory from a social perspective. In fact,
the motivation behind the social security system was exactly such a social
concern with people who might end up with very low consumption possi-
bilities under certain contingencies. The concern was less about whether
a low consumption outcome resulted from individual myopia or bad luck
than about social problems arising from a given behavior. Austan Goolsbee
observed that if one accepts the results of the paper, they seem to imply
that individuals in countries that save much more than the United States
oversave for retirement.
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Dickens suggested improving the simulations in the paper by decom-
posing changes in income into a moving average and a unit root process, as
John Abowd and David Card had done.1 Such decompositions are notori-
ously difficult to identify. However, they are consistent with the idea that
people dissave when they experience temporary unemployment, whereas
they adjust their consumption in response to a permanent loss in income,
for example, when they lose a job in the steel industry and take a job at
McDonald’s. Sims observed that the model assumes that differences in luck
in income realizations are the only source of the wide range of asset-income
ratios. He thought that it should be possible to get some evidence on whether
this is the important source of wealth variation by looking at how strong
the correlation is between the asset position in retirement and the history of
income shocks in the data. If people are irrational, one should observe a lot
of variation in saving among people with similar income histories. 
Nordhaus suggested placing the paper in the context of the literature
that asks whether the life-cycle model can explain national wealth pat-
terns. This literature has failed to come to a consensus, with Franco
Modigliani, among others, claiming that the model gives a good explana-
tion and Lawrence Summers, among others, concluding the opposite. In
his own work on this topic, Nordhaus was struck by how easy it was for the
life-cycle model to generate widely different wealth-income ratios with
relatively small changes in the discount rate and in the elasticity of mar-
ginal utility with respect to consumption. He noted that just using the
simple consumption Euler equation rule and the parameter values in the
paper, the optimal growth rate of consumption with certainty equivalence
is –1.3 percent, which may rationalize low saving. Hence he was skepti-
cal whether exercises like the one in the paper could provide meaningful
tests of the model’s predictive ability. However, Nordhaus did think the
paper made an interesting contribution to this debate: when one compares
the wealth-income distributions from either of the two surveys reported
in the paper with the simulation results, the greatest discrepancies arise for
the wealthiest groups. At the very top of the wealth distribution, inheri-
tances, differences in rates of return on investment, and differences in rates
of investment are probably the key factors that account for the discrepancy
between the data and the simulations. Nordhaus thought that this finding
was worth relating to the earlier life-cycle literature.
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